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The connectivity of the power grid is increasing with the internet of things, and low 
carbon technologies being deployed to help enhance smart grid performance and reliability. 
Meanwhile, they also increase the digital complexity and dependency of cyber assets, which 
might be vulnerable to cyber-physical threats, and hence may impact the reliability of power 
systems. Due to cyber-threats’ unpredictable nature, the interactive operation of low carbon 
technologies with cyber-physical systems is becoming a challenging task for smart grids. This 
thesis proposes novel mathematical frameworks to estimate the availability of photovoltaics 
and heat pumps with cyber-physical components. These frameworks are developed to quantify 
the level of risk posed by cyber-threats to the interactive operation of photovoltaics and heat 
pumps, using Markov-Chains. The availability framework considers the severity of random 
cyber-attacks on photovoltaics and the probability of cyber-threats with mean time to detection-
time on heat pump operation. Sensitivities of the repair times of cyber-physical component for 
photovoltaics and sensitivities of cyber-attack-detection time for heat pumps are also evaluated. 
The impact of cyber threats on the interactive operation of photovoltaics and heat pumps are 
considerable and inconsistent, however the propagation of cyber-threats can be restricted by 
appropriate means of photovoltaics. For heat pumps, operational reliability substantially 
decreases due to the unavailability of their control panel. Contributions of this thesis include an 
availability model for photovoltaic configurations, an innovative approach to assess the 
reliability of a photovoltaic integrated power system with cyber-physical interactions, the 
availability estimation of heat pump with variable detection time, and an enhanced cyber-
intrusion process model for reliability analysis of heat pumps. The findings offer insight into 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Status Quo of Power Systems 
The principal goal of a power system is to supply electricity to customers with the high 
quality, secure, and uninterrupted level of service, which is as affordable as possible. The power 
system is considered as a critical infrastructure and it needs continuously adapt to necessary 
technological developments for hi-performance with regards to operation and reliability [4]. 
Nevertheless, due to the complexity of power systems with its enormous size, the adaptation of 
electricity grid into new technological innovations has proceeded slowly. Power system 
operation with a traditional structure would lead to reduce the system efficiency, increase 
difficulties in operation, and challenges to maintain forthcoming electricity demand. Future 
electricity demand is expected to reach high levels, whereas the current generation systems may 
not fully meet the projected demand. This status is likely to affect the system limits [5-7]. As 
the system demand keeps on growing with similar projections [5, 6], power system is forced to 
operate with its boundary limits, and its reliability has evolved into a critical problem.  
 
A traditional power system (Figure 1.1) is centralised in nature, from the perspective of 
controllability and transmissibility of power. Traditional power systems operate from 
 





centralised generators throughout transmission and distribution infrastructure towards end-
users with a unidirectional concept. Thus, a malfunction or a physical failure in any section of 
traditional power systems could affect many consumers and their assets due to cascading 
collapse, and even great deals of economic loss. According to [8], power systems have 
experienced ten major blackouts around the globe during last decade. Most of power outages 
have occurred due to the reasons of the tripping of assets, overloading during peak time, and a 
lack of self-monitoring on operational status [8]. As a solution to conventional and ageing 
power infrastructure, an increasing amount of DER with ICT might diminish the impact of 
power outages, and also increase the operability, controllability, and manageability of power 
systems. 
     
          The existing electricity grid is undergoing a transformation called “Smart Grid”, and is 
gradually becoming more technologically intelligent than before [9]. Smart grid can be defined 
 





as a modernised power grid that supplies electricity to end-users by utilising digital control and 
monitoring mechanisms [9]. 
Smart grid (Figure 1.2) is digitalized in nature owing to its bidirectional communication, 
as it has sensors throughout, two-way energy flows, decentralised generations, many consumer 
choices, and pervasive control loads [9]. Due to environmental legislations, low carbon 
technologies are pushing power systems more into the direction of smarter grid systems [10]. 
Therefore, the smart grid has become a product of highly complex architecture with self-
monitoring characteristics. As a result, it allows end-users to be prosumers and to interact 
energy management systems in order to regulate their energy consumption as well as to 
minimise utilised electricity costs [9]. The concept of smart grid includes self-healing features 
that mitigates sudden failures [9]. It forecasts imminent actions and stabilises operating 
conditions in optimum levels [9]. 
Besides the benefits gained by coupling smart grids with controllability criteria, smart 
grid presents a large number of challenges as new technologies and innovations becoming 
incorporated into and influential upon the system operation. Supposing that high penetration of 
intermittent distributed generations in a power grid, these generation units might stress the 
operation of transmission and distribution lines and might also result in voltage-var 
management issues. For instance, distribution systems could face a circuit congestion as a 
consequence of uncontrolled levels of increasing active loads. Other DER technologies such as 
heat pumps, electric vehicles, and batteries can assist to the power systems in the context of 





In the meantime, apart from all profound alterations and difficulties with the 
transformation of grid, the primary goal of a power system still remains unchanged, which 
continuously serve the electric power to end-users in secure limits and with standardised 
quality. Hence, the system reliability needs to keep in step with the revolutionary transformation 
of power systems.     
1.2 Status Quo of Low Carbon Technologies and ICT 
Many developed countries have already announced their projections on the 
transformation of power sector and have started to change their energy policies according to 
climate change targets [12, 13]. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) have entered into a 
binding agreement to cut carbon emission by 50% in 2050 compared to 1990 levels [12]. In 
order to achieve these targets, high-level integrations of low carbon technologies in power 
networks are considered as an essential step by authorities and stakeholders. In particular, 
photovoltaic (PV) and heat pump (HP) systems are likely to be essential driving factors in order 
to mitigate carbon footprint. 
In perspective of renewable generation, one of the promising technologies is PV, of which 
the source is free, sustainable, and environmentally friendly. PVs are substantial instruments in 
low carbon transitions, and utilization of them is expected to reach high levels. As maintained 
by envisioned guidelines of governments, net generation capacity of PV technologies reached 
402 GW during the year of 2017 globally [14], and the total capacity of PVs is projected to 
reach up to 1721 GW in 2030 [15]. In other respects, total installed capacity of PVs in the UK 
has exceeded 12 GW at the end of 2017, in almost 10 years [16]. With this ambitious high 




challenges [17]. For instance, when the power grid is connected with high penetration of PV 
systems, there can be voltage fluctuations, rise, thermal overloading issues, etc. [17]. These 
issues could cause system local failures on the power systems, and therefore reduce the power 
system reliability.  As the intermittency of PV generations, the reliability of power grid should 
be carefully examined for system performance continuity in high levels.     
 With regard to renewable heat generation, governments are offering incentives to 
popularize consumers renewable heat technologies such as HPs [18]. As a result, there has been 
renewed interest in the deployment of HPs, and their increment on power grid is likely to reach 
high level [18-20]. It is expected that total number of installed HPs will peak at a rate of 5.4-
5.6 GWt level by 2020 in the UK [19]. Accordingly, HPs are likely to play a key role in 
addressing the reduction of greenhouse gases. They also give benefits to the whole system, but 
only if the generated electricity is decarbonised. HP technology might save heating sector from 
the dependency of natural gas usage. Beside the provided advantages by HP, it could also bring 
integration challenges into power grid and reduce the reliable operating conditions of power 
system, e.g. thermal overloading in the power system assets [21], higher demand peaks [22], 
and increasing expenses on reinforcement of the system [23]. Therefore, high installation rates 
of HP systems can be an important concern on the reliability of power systems.  
From the point of system monitoring, the rapid digitalization of power systems 
throughout the integration of communications technologies (ICTs) is incorporated with 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and other cyber-physical sensing infrastructure in 
order to provide support for power systems. For example, AMI have the ability to measure 
electricity use, connect and disconnect local power system operation, isolate outages, monitor 




carbon technologies into power grid, operators should deploy high level of ICT (AMI, PMU 
etc.) to control these technologies remotely [188]. Due to ICT expands attack surfaces with high 
number of access points, high installations of low carbon technologies introduce additional risks 
of unusual operational conditions [188]. In the UK, just over 6 million smart meters were 
installed into all properties until the beginning of 2018 [24].  The installed number of AMI is 
expected to reach 50 million by 2020 [24].  
The increased number of digitalized components in the power sector can bring new 
opportunities to companies and increase co-benefits when power systems take advantage of 
digitalized systems’ monitoring and control characteristics. For example, whether there is an 
interrupted part in the system operation or a failure, digitalized remote control system can send 
information about the system operation state and state of the disturbed parts of the power 
system. These various benefits can improve power system operations according to design and 
planning approaches with internal and external factors. 
On December 2015, Ukrainian distribution utility was faced with cyber-intrusions 
through the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) management systems and the 
utility’s computers [25]. As a consequence, 30 substations were disrupted for three hours due 
to remote controlling of switches by attackers [25]. Thousands of consumers experienced power 
cuts for several hours. Because of the complex nature of these cutting-edge technologies in 
power sector with their related dependent and interdependent faults, consumers and operators 
have been dealing with local operational breaks and even partial blackouts. As a result, these 
interruptions highlight the importance of power system reliability and its studies for the 




1.3 Motivation and the Scope of the Research  
The operation of power systems has always suffered from random physical failures. Due 
to high penetration levels of renewable energy technologies and increasing level of 
digitalization in power grids, these failures are expected to increase and expand failure concepts 
to include cyber-physical failures. As a result, this could trigger changes in power system 
operations and increase the possibility of high-impact low-probability events, such as cyber-
attacks. Traditional power system reliability evaluations consider only physical system 
contingencies with constant failure and repair rates, whereas it does not evaluate the interaction 
of CPS with low carbon technologies. In addition, publicly available data on failure-repair rates 
of CPS, which is required to evaluate their interaction effects on power system reliability, is 
limited. CPS failure and repair rates are inconsistent due to the unpredictable characteristics of 
cyber-threats and erratic cyber-vulnerabilities. Systematically, these vulnerabilities can affect 
the ability of the system to achieve high reliability levels during the system operation. Although 
the CPS interruptions with cyber-intrusions are accepted as extraordinary events with low 
probability, reliability assessments without CPS interactions can mislead power system 
planners and operators and can bring high societal and financial consequences. 
The scope of this research is to assess reliability performance levels considering low 
carbon technologies (PVs and HPs) in a smart power system environment with and without the 
consideration of CPS interactive operation. The availability analysis of renewable energy 
technologies of power systems is also carried out with the internal and external factors of cyber-
physical system operations. In order to achieve the target, generic reliability models of DER 




are presented to demonstrate the impacts of cyber threats in the purview of power system 
reliability. In addition, specific issues related to cyber-attack modelling with DERs are 
identified and discussed in the context of power system reliability. 
1.4 Aim and Objectives  
The aim of this research is to investigate the reliability of a smartly operated power system 
with CPS operation of PV and HP systems. The main objectives of this research are as follow: 
 Investigate effective reliability levels of a power system considering dependency and 
interdependency factors of PV and HP systems. 
 Assess the acceptable penetration levels of PV systems considering dependent and 
interdependent components with controllability criteria of PV systems. 
 Assess the HP system considering the configuration of its dependent and interdependent 
components for power system reliability.  
 Develop an availability modelling framework of a PV system within the perspective of 
CPS interactive operation. 
 Develop an availability analysis platform of HP systems with considering CPS interactive 
operation. 
1.5 Contributions of the Thesis 




1. An innovative methodology is proposed to assess the reliability interaction of a physical 
power system with cyber network by taking into account possible threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
2. A new availability model for PV configuration is proposed to reduce assessment process 
complexity of cyber-physical systems in a holistic way. 
3. A new algorithm is proposed for the reliability assessment of a PV integrated power 
system with cyber physical interactions at PV connections with varying levels of intensity 
of cyber-attacks. 
4. A new mathematical model for HP system configuration is proposed in order to reduce 
assessment process complexity of cyber-physical systems. 
5. A new algorithm is proposed for the reliability assessment of HP systems with cyber 
physical interactions. 
6. An enhanced cyber-intrusion process model is presented for cyber-physical system 
reliability analysis. This model also considers stochastic attack-detection time in cyber-
intrusion process. 
7. Sensitivity analysis of cyber-physical system repair times for PV systems is carried out. 
8. Sensitivity analysis of attack-detection times in cyber-intrusion process for HP systems 
is performed. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
The outline of this thesis is described in Figure 1.3.  
Chapter 2 presents a relevant literature review for this research. The relevant literature is 




in engineering applications, a fundamental understanding of power system reliability and its 
methods, power systems reliability considering low carbon technologies, and its ICT related 
background. The research direction of this thesis is highlighted. 
Chapter 3 highlights the importance of load and generation modelling in the context of 
power system adequacy. The utilized load and generation models are presented. In addition, the 
traditional concept framework for power system reliability assessment is proposed without 
considering cyber-physical system interactions in IEEE RTS79. The case studies demonstrate 
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In chapter 4, the research related to cyber-physical system operation is highlighted by 
also explaining its research problems. The mathematical framework of cyber-physical 
interactive operations considering PV generation systems is proposed with a power system 
reliability procedure. Different case studies are presented with and without ICT extended 
versions of buses in order to understand CPS interactive operation of PV systems. Case studies 
are implemented into either RBTS or IEEE RTS79 in order to assess the integration of PV 
systems. The results are analysed and summarized subject to the power system reliability with 
CPS interactive operation of PV generation.  
In chapter 5, cyber-attack pathways are discussed in relation to smart grid applications, 
and the limitations of previous research are discussed. The mathematical framework of cyber-
attack models and the configuration of HP systems are proposed with power system 
availability-reliability model. The power system reliability evaluation with cyber-intrusion on 
HP systems is demonstrated by case studies, and their results are analysed and discussed.  





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide a fundamental knowledge of power 
system reliability and then its status quo and interactions with PV (Photovoltaic), HPs (Heat 
Pumps), and cyber network operations relevant to this project. Furthermore, it highlights 
concepts of reliability in perspective of traditional and modern power systems. 
Power systems have emerged as necessary platforms for modern society. A fundamental 
concern of a power system is to supply electricity to its consumers in an uninterrupted, safe and 
cost-effective manner [2]. The expectation of a society from a power system is to prevent the 
society from experiencing its unexpected failure and blackouts. Therefore, a power systems’ 
reliability performance and its applications will always be called into question. In general, 
reliability, which is vital for a wide range of scientific and industrial system processes, refers 
to both piecewise or composite element based system availability with their successful working 
conditions [26]. 
Nowadays, power systems are evolving from conventional to smart characteristics and 
this transformation involves high levels of low carbon technology integration and installation 
of information and communication technologies (ICTs). With this revolutionary transition of 
the energy sector, the reliability of power systems has become an essential part of its operation 
and future planning. With this transition, the assessment strategies of power system reliability 
would also have to change in order to perform an accurate and robust evaluation of power 




In the sections of this chapter that follow, relevant literature will be reviewed in the 
context of reliability. Especially, as it contains the concepts of reliability assessment in 
engineering applications, a fundamental understanding of power system reliability and its 
methods, power systems reliability considering low carbon technologies, and its ICT related 
background. In the final part of this chapter, research gaps are highlighted in power system 
reliability related to physical and cyber-physical system operations. 
2.2 Reliability Assessment of Engineering Applications 
The target of this section is to give a general overview of reliability evaluation, reliability 
concept techniques in engineering applications, and particularly the case of power system 
reliability. 
2.2.1 General Concept of Reliability in Engineering Systems 
Engineering systems have a vital role for modern society in order to sustain and facilitate 
daily work processes with consistently secure operating. From basic components to complex 
structures of engineering systems need to be analysed for their past, current and future operation 
conditions to maximise their operation performance, and minimise their failures. These failures 
of engineering systems provoke high societal consequences such as chemical and nuclear 
contaminations, aircraft accidents, large-scale blackouts and many deaths [7, 26]. Hence, these 
severe events have raised the profile of operational conditions of engineering applications [7]. 
The expectation of consumers and the public from life cycle of any engineering system is to 
have less hazardous working circumstances, an economical and a reliable operation status at all 




external factors of engineering systems. These factors in relation to any system’s reliability are 
illustrated as in Figure 2.1. Overall system reliability for engineering applications is engaged 
with balance indicators: time duration, safety, quality, and cost [27]. These indicators are 
generally driven by system’s material, design and technology, environmental and human factors 
[27]. Because of effects of these drivers and severe events, reliability has been preserved for its 
important position in any engineering system.  
 
Figure 2.1 A Diagram for Engineering System Reliability Relation with Factors 
 
2.2.2 Reliability and Availability 
Due to many different environmental circumstances and variety of systems, the meaning 
of ‘Reliability’ differs concept to concept and people to people [2, 7]. There are multiple 
definitions of the term ‘Reliability’. As a general dictionary term, it is paired with ‘being 
trustworthy’ or ‘quality of performance indicator’. As an engineering term, ‘Reliability’ 𝑅(𝑡) 
refers to the probability of a system or element to provide its required duties within specified 
circumstances with operating status for a specific time period [2, 28]. When the time of failure 












𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑡 > 𝑇) 𝑡 ≥ 0 (2.1) 
‘Availability’ is an operational measurement that permit a system to recover if there is 
a system failure.  As a basis, ‘Availability’ 𝐴(𝑡) defines the probability of a system or element 
to provide its required duties within specified circumstances with operating status for a specific 
time moment [2, 28]. The availability of a system is accepted as a reliability merit of a system. 
‘Availability’ and unavailability of a system complete each other and help to measure reliability 
performance of the system. Mathematically, ‘Availability’ 𝐴(𝑡) is defined as [29]: 
𝐴(𝑡) =
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
 (2.2) 
 
2.2.3 Overview of Reliability Techniques in Engineering Systems  
For many years, reliability has been expressed with qualitative and subjective terms by 
engineers [7, 26]. This approach relies experience of engineers or designers on the system 
operation, design and configuration characteristics. Due to subjective judgements, this is a 
deficient approach to have in engineering system as a reliability assessment technique when 
there is a need for change on performance or economic analysis on the system.  In order to meet 
this demand of an engineering system, quantitative analysis need to be involved for a robust 
reliability evaluation. In general, reliability evaluation techniques in engineering systems are 
categorised into two groups: 1) Analytical methods and 2) Numerical methods [7, 26].  This 




2.2.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree analysis, an analytical technique, is one of the most broadly accepted 
techniques for quantification and quantitation of reliability and risk in mission-oriented 
engineering system [30, 31]. Fault tree analysis is identified as a top-down failure analysis tool 
to design and reveal possible failure pathways for system modification, operation and 
planning[7, 30, 31]. The Failure Tree model has a mission to determine undesired events that 
can provoke the system to failure state. By means of quantified overall event probability, the 
system reliability can be judged in perspective of engineering. This technique has also been 
commonly utilized in nuclear power industry, aerospace industry, chemical industry, etc. [7].  
 
Figure 2.2 Flowchart of Fault Tree Process Steps 
Determine Objectives
• Top Event Definition
Identify Fundamental Rules
• Fault Tree Model Construction
Qualitative and Quantitative  
Analysis
• Fault Tree Model Evaluation
Interpretation of Reliability/ Risk





In order to design probable undesired events and identify a combination of failure states, 
Fault Tree analysis utilizes Boolean logic gates such as “OR”, “AND”, etc. For example, when 
there is a group of sub-events, that causes a system down, “OR” gate utilizes in the construction 
of the Fault Tree model. On the other hand, if the all sub-events lead to force main event down, 
“AND” gate is used for the model construction. The expansion criteria of the Fault Tree model 
construction is based on data availability and its detail [7, 26]. The Fault Tree analysis process 
steps [7] are described in Figure 2.2. 
2.2.3.2 Event Tree Analysis 
Event Tree analysis is accepted as an analytical bottom-up technique for identification 
and quantification of undesirable event outcomes linked with various initiating events [7, 31, 
32]. The Event Tree model presents an overall picture of the system’s branches associated with 
its events’ success and failures [7, 31, 32]. It provides a preliminary approach to assess 
chronological sequence of event outcomes. Event Tree analysis is more widely utilized with 
security-oriented system risk analysis. It can be applied into qualitative or quantitative 
reliability assessments of a system. It is associated with Fault Tree analysis. The evaluation in 
Event Tree analysis is similar to Fault Tree analysis. Fault Tree constructing procedure [7] are 
demonstrated as in the following steps: 
1) Define a relevant initial event that may causes undesired consequences 
2) Define the restrictions and barriers that can deal with the initial event (safety functions) 
3) Construct the Event Tree model  




5) Estimate the conditional probability of each tree branches 
6) Quantify the consequences 
7) Present and evaluate the event results 
2.2.3.3 Reliability Block Diagram 
There are other analytical methods utilized in reliability and risk assessments, such as 
minimum cut-set, tie-set, network reduction techniques [7, 26, 33]. These reliability techniques 
can be implemented in the block diagram of a system. In general, a system with its components 
can be demonstrated as a network block. The system network  can be  modelled as a series, 
parallel, meshed or a combination of these configurations [26, 33]. In this part of the section, 
series and parallel system connections with independent elements are presented in context of 
reliability. 
Let C1 and C2 represent independent elements of a system as in Figure 2.3. These two 
components are connected as a series system. The system reliability depends on both 
components’ successfully working condition.  Overall system reliability (Rs) can be calculated 
as in [26]: 
















C1 and C2 are independent elements of a system as in the utilized independent components 
and are described as in Figure 2.4. In order to sustain the successful working order of the system 
network, either ‘C1’or ‘C2’ or both of the components should be in the operating state. If the 
system is considered as a parallel-connected system, then overall system reliability can be 
expressed as in [26]:  
𝑅𝑠 = 𝑅𝐶1 + 𝑅𝐶2 − 𝑅𝐶1 × 𝑅𝐶2 (2.5) 
2.2.3.4 Markov Processes  
A Markov process is defined as a probabilistic model that represents a sequence of variety 
events that each event probability relies on the state accomplished in the previous event [26, 
33]. A  Markov Chain model is a type of Markov property, can be implemented to random 
events, which include discrete or continuous behaviour with subject to the time and space [7, 










the event. Future and past status of the event are independent. Because of this, the Markov 
model should be categorised as memoryless [26, 33]. 
 
Markov property can be seen in availability and reliability evaluations of the system. 
Markov property applications are ranging from basic elements to composite system analysis. It 
is mainly considered for analysing component level reliability as operating and non-operating 
states. This is one of the approaches of Markov modelling. In order to construct availability 
analysis of any engineering system with Markov Chain, its construction steps [7] can be 
described as in Figure 2.5.   
Examine and Determine the System 
Characteristics
• Operational, Non-operational, Semi-
operational, etc... 
Constructing the Scheme
• Determine system states (State 1,...,State N)
Build the Transition Matrix (T)
Implementing Markov Chain Approach
• Limiting state probability vector (P)
• Transition matrix (T)
• Solve  P×T=P




2.2.3.5 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Numerical methods for reliability evaluation in engineering are alternative approaches to 
analytical methods in reliability, one of which is “Monte Carlo simulation”. This method is 
based on repetition of random sampling of given statistical data or probability distributions [2]. 
The requirement for this method is element failure-repair time data and system network 
configurations. The failure and recovery times of each element is represented by probability 
distributions of given or generated data.  The system reliability indicators can be computed after 
applying large number of the simulation iterations into the process. By implementing this, 
reliability indexes of the given system can be estimated.  
Monte Carlo simulation methods can be categorised into 1) Sequential and 2) Non-
sequential techniques. Sequential Monte Carlo technique relies on the time dependent system 
or event state sequences. Due to this characteristic, a chronological system or event status can 
be identified [2]. This type of reliability evaluation approach is widely utilized in real life 
applications. Otherwise, non-sequential method considers time independent of event status or 
system states. 
One of the advantages of Monte Carlo simulations is to have a flexibility in the reliability 
evaluation and, there is no virtual restriction compared to deterministic approaches. On the 
other hand, there is no exact result in Monte Carlo simulations. They give estimated solutions 
of reliability indicators. Because of this, there are also a certain number of advantages and 
disadvantages on reliability analysing methods, the selected reliability assessment approach 
cannot be guaranteed to deal with whole system reliability characteristics [26]. Therefore, 




merits and demerits [2, 26]. In specific cases, selected reliability approach may be a 
combination of the analytical method and the Monte Carlo simulation method. In this thesis, 
the hybrid reliability technique is also applied into relevant systems in further chapters. 
2.3 Reliability Assessment in Power Systems  
The electric power system, which is regarded as a highly sophisticated technological 
development in history invented by humankind, has a complex working order and a multitude 
of uses application in modern society. This phenomenal system is composed of many complex 
and complicated structures, systems, combined sub-systems, interactive operational 
components and applications, which have communication capabilities. Even though this system 
is associated with communication complexity and structural intricacy, the main objective of 
power systems is supplying, transferring and utilizing electric power to consumers while 
maintaining adequate security, quality and economic levels [2].  This mission also needs to be 
sustained with an acceptable level of continuity to avoid blackouts and brownouts. Electricity 
for consumers should be supplied whenever it is required by users. Power utilities have been 
faced with the problem of avoiding many massive blackouts and brownouts [34, 35]. Because 
of these catastrophic events with their high societal consequences, power system reliability has 
been often scrutinised and evaluated in all times.   
2.3.1 Power System Reliability 
As previously highlighted, reliability is one of the essential processes of any system that 
indicates system quality level for its current or future status according to encountered 




reliability for power systems. Reliability of a power system, is a performance sign for power 
system quality and economics, can be referred to as providing electric power in an adequate 
and secure degree [2, 7]. Thus, power system reliability is one the primal necessity evaluation 
concepts in power system planning, design and operation stage. 
Traditional energy networks have a complicated nature, unidirectional energy flow and 
uncontrolled passive loads [9]. Due to the nature of this complex integrated system and its 
related failures, customers and operators have been facing electricity interruptions and 
disruptions [11]. These are not new experiences for stakeholders, but outage of electricity 
utilization is bringing a significant economic effect into the society directly or indirectly [34]. 
Existing energy networks have been developing in conjunction with distributed energy 
resources as well as communication components [11, 17, 36]. These new devices are expected 
to bring new challenges for customer side of the network and whole system.  
Power system reliability evaluation is classified into two fundamental perspectives that 
are related to power systems’ static, transient and dynamic status: 1) power system adequacy 
and 2) power system security. To integrate and operate any power system application or 
components in the energy networks within global reliability criteria, these two aspects of power 
system reliability should be taken into account [2, 7]. 
In terms of power system, ‘adequacy’ can be defined as a capability of existing electric  
power system that covers consumer energy demand in a satisfactory manner considering its 
operational restrictions [2, 7]. Power system adequacy involves evaluating required energy 
supplied and transferred to customer load points by distribution and transmission networks[2, 




In broad terms, ‘security’ can be expressed the capability of electric power system to stay 
in global security limits without any high consequences [2, 7]. Security is associated with power 
system reaction against taken place dynamic and transient interruptions in the system process. 
In order to evaluate power system security, one of the widely utilized approaches is to do a 
contingency analysis. There are several kinds of contingency analysis; N-1 and N-2 are very 
common approaches in power system security. N-1 contingency evaluation, considers single 
contingency, is utilized for planning stage of power system to avoid cascading failures during 
system operation [37]. Security planning and projection standard of power system is based on 
N-1 contingency analysis. System planners and operators also considers N-2 contingency 
analysis if there is a possibility of losing two components simultaneously during power system 
operations [37]. During the power system reliability assessment, it is essential to differentiate 
the perspectives of power system adequacy and security.  
2.3.2 Hierarchical Levels of Power Grid 
Power systems are mainly classified into electric power generation, power transmission 
and power distribution systems [38]. Due to increasing high structural complexity from power  
generation system to power distribution systems, adequacy assessment of power systems are 
also divided into three  hierarchical levels [2] as in Figure 2.6. These segments are associated 
with generation, transmission and distribution system facilities. 
Hierarchical level one (HL1) only considers the reliability of power generation systems. 
In this segment, transmission network with its energy transportation ability to meet consumer 
load demand is neglected in adequacy evaluations. In other respects, Hierarchical level two 




The adequacy assessment of HL2 segment has an ability to assess individual load point and 
overall system reliability indicators. Hierarchical level three (HL3) combines and examines all 
three segments adequacy ranging from generation systems to power distribution system that 
includes individual consumers and prosumers. The adequacy assessment of HL3 segment is the 
most complex and incorporates impact of interruption frequency, duration and severity. 
 In order to carry out an adequacy assessment on any of these segments, standard 
reliability indicators have been developed [39-41]. Standardised reliability indicators of HL1, 
HL2 and HL3 segments are described in [40], [39] and [41] respectively. 
2.3.3 Overview of Power System Reliability Studies 
The evaluation of power system reliability is a necessary and vital process for 













their deployment planning stage to the present status [42, 43]. There is a large volume of 
published studies describing the role of reliability indicators power system planning and 
operations [44-50]. Power systems needs to be evaluated with the perspective of its hierarchy 
[49, 50]. Power system reliability indicators have been calculated with deterministic methods 
[44, 48], probabilistic approaches [45, 46, 49, 50], and combination of deterministic and 
probabilistic aspects [47]. In general, most of the literature has focused on 1) the examination 
of the some system restrictions on composite power system reliability, 2) new models and 
system components impacts, 3) planning and optimization techniques on system reliability, 4) 
computing technique efficacy [51].  
Reliability evaluation studies of HL1 segment first were published in the 1930s [52]. 
Published literature during this period was accepted as pioneering reliability studies [52]. It was 
suggested in [53] that generation and load demand should be evaluated in a dependent approach. 
The importance of loss of load [54], and frequency-duration [55, 56] approaches were 
demonstrated in the context of generation system reliability. 
There is also a large volume of published studies describing the role of HL2 segment’s 
reliability evaluation. The reliability research on HL2 segment is still needed and it could assist 
provision of information on power system planning and operations for decision makers and 
planners. Most of the studies have used the Monte Carlo and Markov Chain techniques, and 
also there have been unusual techniques which are applied into reliability evaluation such as 
the artificial neural network method [57] and game theory [58]. In perspective of system 
reliability, these implemented methods, especially the Monte Carlo simulation method, have 
been utilized in identification of critical components of transmission systems [59], and 




A considerable amount of literature has been published about the reliability evaluation of 
distribution systems. These studies are mainly focussed on system operation cost, interruption 
of generating systems, demand-side status (load shedding and curtailment), impact of system 
topology and configurations, effect of integration new components etc. Many articles evaluate 
reliability indicators of HL3 in the context of system operation conditions [61-63]. Each 
distribution system unit and its size and placement play key roles in distribution system 
reliability. If planners and decision makers are to ensure high operation standards to customers, 
they need to examine the system reliability and boost the system to optimum reliability levels 
[64, 65]. HL3 studies have also considered energy resource variation (dispatchable or non-
dispatchable) and energy resource availability. These distributed generation circumstances are 
a vital part of system restoration and operation continuity of conventional generators as well as 
renewables [66]. 
Before the last three decades, the target of most of the power system reliability studies 
was to do an evaluation that showed the criticality of traditional power system components in 
composite system levels without considering renewable energy and smart grid technologies. 
With the integration of these innovative technologies, it has been understood that traditional 
reliability techniques are inappropriate due to their uncertainty and intermittency [67]. 
2.4 Power System Reliability Considering Low-Carbon 
Technologies  
Electric power systems are passing from revolutionary low carbon transition that has an 
essential mission to minimise utilization and deployment of fossil fuel technologies and 




available considering either supply-side or demand-side. Such technologies photovoltaics, wind 
turbines, biomass, heat pumps, electric vehicles are already integrated into power systems. In 
order to reach ambitious targets of low carbon transition, stakeholders and power system 
planners would be faced with significant operation and placement challenges [17, 68, 69].  
Because of intermittent features of new power resources, load demand and weather 
uncertainties, and random failures of power assets, power systems are having more operation 
disturbances, brownouts and blackouts compared to conventional operation time of power 
systems [70]. As a result of these transitions, there would also be an impact on power system 
reliability inevitably [71]. Power system operators and planners need to transform traditional 
reliability assessment approaches and its applications according to standard reliability levels for 
analysing intermittency and uncertainty of low carbon technologies. 
In the next sub-sections, relevant literature of PV powered system and electric heat pumps 
will be presented with consideration of technology characteristics, working principles, their 
interactions with power systems. 
2.4.1 Electric Heat Pumps 
Electric Heat pumps, are globally recognised as low carbon heat generation technology 
for residential, industrial, and commercial usage of society, are taking heat resources from an 
outdoor environment such as water, ground and ambient air with auxiliary electricity and 
injecting heat to indoor environment [72]. 
Most of the electrically driven heat pumps can be utilized in a reversible approach for 
heating and cooling load demand of dwelling. Heat pump’s specific working principles with its 




respect, COP of the electric heat pump, by means of previously determined heating (QHeating) 
and cooling (QCooling)  demand of dwelling, low (outdoor, TL) and high (indoor, TH) temperatures 











+ 1.0 (2.7) 
This promising electrically driven-heat generation technology is mainly divided into three 
categories according to type of heat source: Air-Source Heat Pump (ASHP), Ground-Source 
Heat Pump (GSHP), and Water-Source Heat Pump (WSHP). They have been integrated into 
power systems in many developed and developing countries and their deployment trend will 
continue to reach significant levels into the power grid due to global carbon emission targets 
[72, 74]. In case of the United Kingdom, the interest of HP’s integration has been re-established 
and its increment level on energy sector is expected to hit extremely high levels [19, 20]. 
Especially, air-source heat pumps which will have a significant positive impact on carbon 
emissions for the UK’s 2050 targets [75].  
From a technical advantage point of view, heat generation transformation is expected to 
bring increased flexibility to the system operation on supply-side fluctuations  and consumer 
flexibility on demand-side management [76, 77]. Within the smart grid vision, researchers have 
carried out heat pump studies in the centre of supply-demand flexibility that is related to 
demand-side management, demand response and distributed energy resources [72]. HPs are 
bringing greater level of flexibility and peak demand shaving opportunity to the existing energy 




reliability and safety [78, 79]. It has been observed that another advantage is in [78] that HPs 
with possible DSM strategy could reduce electricity bills significantly and help to reduce carbon 
emissions per dwelling. Except these advantages, these technologies also have a number of 
serious technical and economic drawbacks to the energy networks and society.  
From a technical disadvantage point of view, there is a great deal of literature highlighting 
challenges experienced by operating HP’s [20, 23, 72, 78, 79]. According to [20, 78], it is 
pointed out that technical issues of HPs that GSHP need a large space in the ground for 
installation and ASHPs have a number of problems such as noise and inadequate productivity. 
Moreover, due to cooling load demand is in low consumption level on summer in UK, 
deployment of these technologies can be affected negatively in consideration of investment. As 
in [23], increase on load demand at peak time, significant voltage drop, and transformer thermal 
overloading have been observed and the high penetration level of HPs is applied that can lead 
to not only hazardous influences on reliability of individual devices on the related energy 
network. Although most of the literature of heat pump research are associated with smart grid 
load-generation control management, system optimization-impact analysis and electric heat 
pump load modelling [77, 80-82], any of these studies do not directly cover reliability issues of 
heat pumps their related impacts on power systems. 
With the consideration of power system reliability, recently published reference [83] 
represents a stochastic study to investigate optimum placement of air-source heat pumps in 
power grid and its related reliability issues. The benefit of this study [83] is to demonstrate and 
analyse uncertainty characteristics of distributed generation with heat pumps in a holistic 
approach. On the other hand, the study is not composed of detailed component reliability of 




only implemented into radial distribution systems, no consideration of ring or meshed system 
topologies [83]. 
There is also the Markov chain approach on availability system modelling applied into 
heat pumps’ and other heat generation systems’ reliability studies [84-87], but this approach 
has been utilized in a limited number of literature papers. References [85-87] purpose 
availability and reliability analysis of different heat generation technologies as well as heat 
pumps in the context of mechanical system features. Mechanical reliability indicators of 
ground-source heat pump have been introduced by using Markov transition matrix [87]. 
Heating system reliability studies [85, 86] are more advance compared to [87].  These two 
researches [85, 86]  are considered as reliability analysis of combined cooling, heating and 
power systems with the top-down approach. Both of the studies have evaluated the system 
reliability without considering power system reliability. System elements’ configuration is 
demonstrated in both studies for system availability assessment with Markov chain [85, 86]. 
The difference between [85] and [86], mechanical availability and reliability evaluation are 
utilized for maintenance prioritization analysis of system components in [85]. 
A recently published study [84] examines overall system reliability of heat network with 
renewable generation in the context of power system reliability. The study evaluates combined 
cooling, heating and power system in distribution system levels. The study objective is to 
increase renewable energy generation capacity of power distribution network with utilizing 
optimum number of heat pump technology [84]. However, there is no consideration of the 
impact on communication elements of heat pumps on operational system reliability [84]. 
Together all these studies provide important insights of heat pumps for power systems as well 




2.4.2 Photovoltaic (PV) Powered Generation Systems 
Basically, solar PV can be defined as electricity generation from solar light and is done 
by direct conversion [88]. PV generation systems have many pros and cons for society. Their 
advantages are being reliable systems, having a low cost operation and maintenance, clean and 
free energy resource, having a high level of operational availability during clear weather, eco-
friendly, noiseless and decreasing greenhouse gas emission levels for society [88]. Otherwise, 
auxiliary system availability limitation of PV (evacuated tube collectors for solar thermal PVs) 
in some markets, high capital cost, large area for instalment and geographical conditions are 
disadvantages of PV technologies for society [88]. 
Although this technology has some drawbacks, PVs are accepted as fundamental 
elements in low carbon transitions, and usage of them are expected to reach  high levels [89]. 
High penetration of PV systems into power network can bring two-way power flow experience, 
voltage increment, and fluctuations in the power network [17, 90]. These characteristics give a 
clue to stakeholders that reliability analysis of future energy networks is expecting to be 
differentiated with existing ones. Because of this transform, new aspects on reliability 
assessment may play a vital role for integration of PV systems into power grid. According to 
its capacity level on power grid, PVs can be mainly classified into three categories. These are 
utility–scale (1-10 MW), medium-scale (10-1000 kW) and small-scale (up to 10 kW) PV 
systems [17].  
The existing literature on PV system reliability is extensive and focuses on many different 
aspects of PV. Therefore, the literature review of PV systems can be divided into two 




the literature consist of the impact of PV system configurations, critical elements of PV systems, 
reliability assessment methods for PV systems and its intermittency impacts. The futuristic 
aspects of PV systems are composed of cyber-physical components that includes their effect on 
power system reliability, voltage management scheme of PV systems and the effect of extreme 
weather conditions. 
Due to high intermittency and uncertainty characteristics of PV systems with their internal 
and external effects, power systems are already facing high risk of disturbances during their 
operation and planning stage [91-93]. These intermittency characteristics, includes environment 
humidity and temperature, high-voltage bias and solder bond integrity, are affecting disturbance 
and interruption rates of PV systems in power grid according to lifetime of PV subsystems and 
components such as power electronic components significantly [94, 95].  
If there is a necessity of consistent electric power with PV systems for critical loads in 
such telecommunication and medical systems sectors, battery becomes a vital component for 
PV systems, especially for stand-alone PV systems [95]. Batteries could affect PV system 
operational reliability during extreme temperatures, but improved life cycle of batteries and 
their low cost of maintenances could increase overall PV system reliability and minimise PV 
system operation costs [95].  
There has also been great attention on PV system inverters with respect to operational 
system reliability and they have been accepted as most vulnerable components of PV systems 
[96-98]. In addition, PV system modules (solar cells), capacitors, and inverter topologies have 
critical positions during the reliability analysis of PV power systems. These studies [99, 100] 




reliability assessment of PV system is limitation in this studies [99, 100]. Some commercially 
available PV technologies are subject to string topologies with individual independently 
operation and this approach can be beneficial during the PV system operation due to individual 
disturbance and interruptions. If there is a fault on a PV string, other PV strings can still continue 
for PV system operation and generate electricity [101]. 
Moreover, the configuration of inverters and their internal electronic parts have a huge 
impact on PV system reliability and generation losses according to [102, 103]. Introducing new 
smart inverter concepts in direction of autonomous control can decrease energy losses and rise 
operational reliability of PV systems, but also the system vulnerability can be maximised  by 
their software operations[104]. Solutions for all these problems have been introduced in the 
direction of voltage management and implementing new equipment into the power grid. 
However, mitigating the problems with these solutions are probably going to increase PV 
powered systems’ capital and operation costs, which are undesirable for investors and operators 
[100, 105].  It is clearly shown in previous studies [92, 93, 95, 96, 99-101, 103-105] how 
performance dependencies of PV systems can reveal reliability issues, nonetheless, these 
technologies should be deemed by its status from basic component to composite level including 
transmission and distribution networks during power system reliability assessments. 
For composite reliability analysis for PV systems, there have been various methods and 
techniques introduced. In respect to low carbon technology performance factors, the Monte 
Carlo and analytical methods have had a significant contribution on assessment of operation 
reliability of PV systems [101]. Markov chain availability analysis is implemented into a 
reliability assessment in order to estimate performance metrics with energy yield of PV system 




highlight PV-weather intermittency effects on overall power system reliability [105]. The 
reliability of PV powered systems with cloudy impacts under weather conditions is evaluated 
in [106, 107]. Agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial area loads are analysed in 
direction of reliability performance of PV system within detailed cloudy effects by Markov 
Chain state transition model [107]. Reference [107] describes that cloudy effects brings huge 
impacts on PV system operation and reliability when the integration of PV systems into power 
grid is in high levels. Nevertheless, these two studies are only considered weather conditions 
and neglected cyber-physical operation of PV system for power system reliability [106, 107].  
During the peak time of PV system operations, power system can suffer from voltage 
fluctuation and high voltage issues due to intermittency and reverse power flow. Because of 
these problematic statuses, power electronics of PV systems are accepted as the most affected 
part that is less reliable compared to other parts [94, 95].  Before the effect on inverters, on load 
tap changer and capacitor banks can be integrated into the power grid in order to mitigate 
voltage issues with active voltage management. Advantages of voltage control management 
mechanism for smart grids have been introduced in [108, 109]. Nevertheless, it is indicated that 
this control mechanism brings extra capital cost for PV system investments by implementing 
communication infrastructures [108, 109]. According to [109], voltage control schema with PV 
system can increase power system reliability, in addition, by evolving network characteristics 
with active voltage control management could also alter PV generation output levels. 
With increasing communication infrastructure in power systems, cyber-vulnerability is 
increased and it is noticed its importance on power system reliability [101]. In general, power 
system in classic reliability studies is seen as a pure physical system. Though, cyber-physical 




parts of power systems including PV systems have cyber interactions with system components 
such as DC-AC or DC-DC converters’ and voltage control algorithms, maximum power point 
trackers, smart inverters etc. [110]. Due to cyber vulnerability characteristics of PV systems, 
power system reliability as well as power outputs of PV systems can be influenced harmfully. 
Thus, PV’s cyber-physical parts should also be considered during the reliability analysis of PV 
powered systems. 
2.5 Power System Reliability Considering Information and 
Communication Technologies 
With having smarter and automated power grids, the importance of Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) has increased for power system operation and control 
[110]. With assistance of ICTs on power grid, network operators can keep system operations in 
a more reliable, secure and steady conditions. For instance, if there is a faulted part during the 
power system operation, smart automation-control system can open switch and send 
information about faulty part of the system. Due to these two-way communication capabilities 
on remote sites in smart grids, ICT devices can encourage attackers to access power system 
network and lead to interruptions on power system operations. Moreover, attackers provoke 
brownouts and blackouts by connecting communication network that can result in high societal 
consequences [111].  
Considering the communication network of power systems, there are many subsystems 
and devices deployed in order to improve power system operations and control. These 
technologies can be Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), substation 




and Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Distributed Energy Resources (DER) 
management system, distribution automation-control systems for distribution level networks 
[112]. These technologies are mainly integrated for increasing power system performance, 
observability and interoperability [112]. Besides advantages, it has been observed that they can 
bring also vulnerabilities on power system operation by opening gates for intruders [35]. 
According to records [113], forty six cyber-intrusions or cyber incident related failures have 
occurred and they affected power system utilities and stakeholders in 2015. These harmful 
events on smart infrastructures of power grids is expected to be increase, and as result of this, 
decrease operational reliability of power systems. Cyber vulnerabilities can be classified into 
three domains: application software threats, communication network threats and field device 
threats [114]. In general, increasing complexity, options (ZigBee, Wi-Fi) and interconnections 
in ICT components [115], connecting power system ancillary services with external 
communication links and extensively pervasive internal two-way communication links can 
bring cyber vulnerabilities for power systems significantly [114]. To maintain reliability of 
power system within the optimum operation levels, these new technologies and related 
vulnerabilities should be considered in planning and operation stages of power grids and 
examined in power system reliability studies.  
There have been numerous efforts in the power system reliability assessments that are 
mainly based on physical system reliability, not including cyber-physical segments of power 
systems. Power system reliability studies considering physical systems have reviewed in 
previous sections. This section focusses on cyber-physical system interactions of power system 
reliability that includes impact analysis of ICTs on power system related to cyber-attack and 




In this context, the literature is reviewed under umbrella of power systems reliability-
impact studies on cyber-physical systems and it is divided into security study analysis [116-
125], adequacy study analysis [126-138] and other impact studies [139-141] as in Figure 2.7. 
A number of studies have focussed on contingency-oriented reliability assessment [119, 122-
125]. In reference [123], intruder is targeted phasor measurement unit (PMU) and the result of 
cyber intrusion is to have n-1 contingencies in different lines. 
In addition, the defensive solution against intruder has been proposed with optimal 
allocation of PMU and finding PMU criticality levels for the power systems that can prioritize 
power system operation budget [123]. Generators [124], lines [124] and substations [122, 124, 
125] have been considered with multiple failure cases for overall power system operational 
reliability. In these studies [119, 122, 124, 125], it is suggested that security-oriented reliability 
analysis on cyber enabled power systems should consider conventional contingency approaches 
(n-1 and n-2), but also cascading contingencies for composite operational reliability. Following 
studies performed substation protection analysis [116, 118, 125], cascading failure impact 
analysis [117, 122, 125], resiliency analysis [121], voltage regulation assessment [120], general 
failure analysis related to cyber-enabled systems [119]. 
For these security related assessments, reviewed literature utilized different type of 
attacks in order to demonstrate cyber-physical system impacts on power system reliability. 
These are categorised into three types: false data injection attacks [116, 117, 123], coordinated 
attacks [122, 125] and generalised attacks [118, 121, 122, 124] that represent cyber-attacks 
without having any categorisations. Most of these studies evaluated power system reliability in 
perspective of security-orientation and they did not include adequacy analysis or had very 




power system is increased against N-1 contingencies with possible cyber-attacks by proposed 
optimization technique and loss of load is decreased. 
 
The literature on power system adequacy related to cyber physical system operations has 
highlighted several aspects and pointed out direct and indirect impacts on power system 
reliability [126, 127]. The cyber-physical system interaction with power systems and its related 
general cyber link failures have examined in [126, 127, 130, 131]. Power system direct [127] 
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Type of Analysis or Attack Location
 Contingency [102,105-108]
 Cascading Failures [100,105,108]
 Substation [99,101,108]
 Resiliency [104]
 Voltage Regulation [103]
 General Cyber Failures [102]
Type of Cyber-attacks
 False Data Injection [99,100,106] 
 Coordinated [105,108] 
 Generalised [101, 104, 106, 107]
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 SCADA[118-121]
 Cascading Failures [112]
 Substation [116,117]
 Feeders [111]
 Attack cost balance [112,115,116]
 General Cyber Failures 
[109,110,113,114]
Type of Cyber-attacks
 False Data Injection [115, 116, 
118-121] 
 Coordinated [112] 
 Generalised [111, 117]
 






and indirect [126] cyber interdependency effects, which include cyber-attacks on power grid 
applications, cyber-physical system’s unreliability, cyber-malfunctioning and cyber-
destruction on power system monitoring-protection systems, have considered in power system 
adequacy analysis. It has been demonstrated that direct and indirect impacts of cyber-physical 
system interaction with power systems can significantly reduce power system reliability [126, 
127]. According to these findings, failure and repair rates of power system applications should 
be updated for power system reliability assessments. Moreover, references [130, 131] have 
implemented non-sequential and sequential Monte Carlo simulations for cyber-physical system 
reliability interaction with power systems. There are only considerations that consists of cyber-
dynamic routing, delay, and communication errors and cyber traffic [130, 131]. Such studies 
[126, 127, 130, 131], however, have not included cyber-attack models and assumed failure-
repair rates of some cyber-physical components. In addition, they did not demonstrate cyber-
impacts on low carbon technologies and related effects on power system reliability. 
A number of studies have examined and highlighted cyber-attacks’ impacts on different 
part of power system applications and components. The impacts of cyber-attacks have 
evaluated on SCADA [135-138], substations [133, 134], power system feeders [128] and 
transmission line [129]. In addition, these studies have implemented different type of attacks 
that are false data injection attacks [132, 133, 135-138], coordinated attacks [129] and 
generalised attacks [128, 134] for analysing power system adequacy. By means of game theory, 
attack–defence mechanism have modelled in the most of the literature [135-138]. In general, 
attack models have considered successful intrusion pathways with time duration of cyber 
intruders in the system for statistical calculations [135-138]. These mathematical calculations 




system outages. Due to unavailability data of cyber-physical system’s failure and repair rates, 
these calculations can be utilized for quantifying statistical frequency of cyber disruptions and 
interruptions in order to implement into reliability calculations of power systems. It has been 
already clarified failure and repair rates of traditional power system’s components and 
applications. However, this information is still not clear for cyber-physical system’s 
interactions with power systems and it has been assessed very limited in current power system 
reliability studies. The main reason can be data unavailability of cyber-physical system 
interruptions due to lack of experiencing cyber-attacks and being new technologies or being not 
shared by stakeholders because of national security. This problem keeps up to date for power 
system reliability.  
Cost–budget balance of cyber-security on attack-defence modelling have attracted some 
researchers in order to reduce operation costs of cyber security of power systems. The main 
target of these studies is to model optimum defence resources to reduce or limit expenses of 
power system operation as well as cyber-impacts by analysing of cyber-physical power system 
reliability [129, 132, 133]. 
Except these studies [116-138], there are other impact studies has been carried out in the 
context of cyber-physical system interactive operations [139-141]. The power system state 
estimation has been evaluated during sparse attacks [141] and false data injection attacks [139]. 
Reference [141] have examined sparse cyber-attacks in perspective of voltage control with AC 
power flow. In addition, reference [139] have performed an optimization technique reduce the 
cost of launching a cyber-attack in power system with lack of power network information. 
However, it has explored that cyber-intruders can also identify critical cyber-links and cyber-




and related cyber-vulnerabilities have been very essential for attackers how to going forward to 
force the power system outages and minimize power system reliability and operations [140].  
2.6 Summary  
This chapter presents fundamental concepts of reliability engineering and reviews 
relevant literature in the context of power systems reliability and its interactions with PV, HPs, 
and cyber network operations relevant to this research project. Section 2.2 introduces definition 
of reliability and related concepts for engineering point of view and relevant reliability 
assessment methods for engineering applications. Section 2.3 presents power system reliability 
concepts in perspective of traditional approach and reviews necessary literature. Section 2.4 
introduces low carbon technologies (PVs and HPs) in the context of power system reliability 
and explains how these cutting-edge technologies can bring challenges into power grid with 
pointing out relevant literature. Section 2.5 reviews the relevant power system reliability 
literature for power system applications considering cyber-physical system interactive 
operations. It also highlights research gaps on power system reliability considering cyber-
physical systems. 
In the next chapter, effects of load demand and PV generation modelling on power system 






Chapter 3: Power System Reliability Analysis 
without Cyber-Physical System Integration 
3.1 Introduction  
The main aim of this chapter is to analyse power system reliability without considering 
cyber-physical system integration. The chapter describes how intermittent characteristics of 
load demand and power generation can affect power system reliability by exemplifying with 
case studies.  
 Transformation of traditional power systems into smart power systems has been driven 
by the deployment of low carbon technologies including photovoltaics (PVs). The uncertain 
nature of PV generation technology with its high installation level into power grids has been 
problematic for distribution and transmission system operators. Not only high-level deployment 
of PV powered technologies but also, load demand of consumers with its probabilistic 
characteristics has increased the uncertainty pattern of generation-load demand balance for 
power system operators and planners. With this transformation and complex interaction of 
intermittent power generation and load demand, there are also effects of two-way 
communication systems on the evaluation of power system reliability. Before demonstrating 
the impact of cyber-physical systems on power system reliability, this chapter will present 
conventional generation adequacy assessment considering PV powered generation with 




Some sections of this chapter are prepared from the reference [1] of which the first author 
is the author of this thesis. This publication’s case studies and reliability assessment procedure 
have been produced from the research in this chapter. In [1], the first author introduced the 
innovative concepts and ideas of PV generation profile linearization and developed the 
framework of power system reliability evaluation, related simulations and case studies. The 
second author mainly contributed on the methodology of load and PV generation profile 
linearization. The third author designed PV generation model.  
 In the following sections of this chapter, the importance of load and generation 
modelling is presented aligning to a power system adequacy assessment. Then, the load and 
generation models applied to the case studies in this chapter are presented. It is also extended 
with the traditional conceptual framework for power system reliability assessment without 
considering cyber-physical system interactions. In the final part of this chapter, case study is 
presented to demonstrate the intermittent impacts of PV generation and consumer load demand 
profiles on reliability of a power system.  
3.2 Load and Generation Profile Modelling 
3.2.1 Load Modelling   
Load modelling has a substantial effect on power system evaluation studies. With low 
carbon transition, load modelling has received a critical attention from different areas in power 
systems including distributed generation integration, demand-side management and in 
particular from power system planning, operation and control. The uncertainty of the load 
demand is one of the most common concerns for power system operators and planners. 




linked with power system reliability studies. The diversity of load elements, variation on load 
consumption time and weather are increasing challenges on load demand approximation and 
forecasting in order to utilize load profiles in any power system study assessments in this new 
era of emerging power grids [142]. There are many approaches for designing load demand 
profiles, but load modelling can be classified into specific component-based (hypothetical 
approach with theory-based) and measurement-based load modelling [142]. Notably 
measurement-based load models are more suitable compared to component-based ones due to 
its feature that compromises real time consumption data measurements with instantaneous load 
demand behaviour from meters [142]. Resulting from this characteristic, any power system 
reliability assessments can be done for the increase accuracy and robustness. 
Not only stochastic patterns of load profiles but also the total number data points of the 
temporal resolution of load demand curves are essential for power system reliability studies. 
Load curve synthesising with fewer steps could potentially deliver smaller computational times 
for the reliability assessment process, allowing the power system operation and control 
mechanisms to act fast. However, load curves with less resolution can result reduced the 
accuracy of sensitive load points and therefore a solid power system reliability indices may not 
be delivered for the effective utilization. Because of these reasons, the number of steps needed 
in load demand curves and load profiles’ stochastic pattern should be carefully considered for 
power system reliability analysis. 
3.2.1.1 Original and Linearised Load profiles 
Due to the complexity of high volume load data, one of the objectives of the linearisation 




profiles in order to be used in any power system analysis without losing accuracy and robustness 
[143, 144]. The load demand data in this chapter is from the ‘ISSDA CER’ smart metering 
dataset [145]. This load data represents almost 6000 Irish residential and business consumers’ 
load consumption records during the period 2009 to 2010 and original dataset of load demand 
was measured with 30 minutes resolution [143]. Figure 3.1 demonstrates average load demand 
profile of consumers’ data measurements used in this chapter [143]. 
 
To diminish the amount of data usage from smart meters and the intricacy of the utilized 
data, consumers’ load demand data was implemented into the extended k-means clustering 
algorithm for the linearization process [1]. Thirty-eight load demand data clusters were 
generated and each profile was composed of 17520 data measurement records [1]. The effect 
of linearization process of load profiles on power system reliability is examined with case 
studies in following sections of this chapter. The linearisation process is aimed to reduce the 
complexity of utilized data with optimizing the energy capture between original (raw) and 
 








































































































































































linearized load demand profiles [1, 143]. An example of these load profiles has been 
demonstrated in Figure 3.2. The red dotted line and black solid line represent a section of 
linearized load and original demand profiles, respectively in Figure 3.2 [1]. 
 
3.2.2 PV Generation Modelling  
As similar to the load modelling, generation modelling has an important effect on power 
system planning, operation and control studies. Due to global warming and climate change 
effects, renewable power generation profile modelling, particularly on solar PVs generation, 
has received a considerable attention from system and project planners. This increase in 
popularity from power utilities is expected to increase because of high deployment projection 
of solar PV capacity all around world. Since solar PV has an intermittent nature and heavily 
 




relies on geographical and weather conditions, its integration at high capacity level into power 
system causes more difficulties. Power utilities have already been faced with many challenges 
related to PV generation such as in power system stability, security, reliability and so on. The 
modelling of PV generation is subject to its components, design and size characteristics. In 
order to do a robust analysis of PV generation model, power utilities and stakeholders should 
take into account all the features of solar PVs in its model design process [146]. 
The utilized PV generation profile model in this chapter has considered PV system 
operating temperature, solar irradiance and shading with climate conditions for a specific region 
[147]. The geographical location for PV generation was selected as Belfast [1].  
3.2.2.1 Original and Linearized PV generation profiles 
In this chapter, the below PV generation profile is utilized which also incorporates the 
influences of air temperature and solar insolation [1, 147]. Before the linearization process of 
PV generation profiles, hourly PV generation profiles were transformed into half hourly PV 
generation profiles by interpolation. Before the linearization process of PV generation profiles, 
hourly PV generation profiles were transformed into half hourly PV generation profiles by 
interpolation. A half hourly PV generation profile for a year is demonstrated in Figure 3.3. With 
the same methodology implemented into load profile simulation, the linearization process was 
also applied into original PV generation profiles in order to diminish the complexity of them. 
PV generation profiles has been taken from reference [1]. As in Figure 3.4, an executed sample 
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3.3 Methodology for Power System Reliability Assessment 
without Considering Cyber-physical System Integration 
Reliability evaluation of power systems is dependent on analysing all credible states of a 
system’s elements considering their basic and complex configurations. Traditional power 
system reliability evaluation considers a failure model, load model, generation model, the 
design of the system state and statistical analysis in order to generate reliability indices of power 
systems. The failure-repair models can demonstrate behaviour of the system elements during 
fails or repairs with a specific time duration for each event. The failure model also includes how 
often these failure-repair events might occur in a specific time period. As previously 
highlighted, load models can be composed of load demand of consumers or forecasted load 
demand scenarios. In addition, generation models are necessary to supply the system’s load 
demand which is generated by load models. These failure, load and generation models can help 
to design the system states under specific conditions. After defining the system states, a 
statistical calculation can be made to calculate the reliability index with a probabilistic 
approach. A probabilistic model of each component of a power system is subject to failure rate 
and repair time calculations. These calculations depend on the system elements’ availability 
and unavailability status [2]. 
In order to achieve the aim of the power systems, which is to supply the required power 
within a secure, economic and continuous way, the composite power system reliability analysis 
is required to evaluate all credible system conditions within the global and local limits of power 
systems. However, fulfilling the criteria of the power system reliability analysis can holistically 




time of the analysis and the forecasting accuracy of available generation and load demands [1].  
With respect to these challenges, the process of power system reliability needs to be carefully 
considered from all proponents with possible scenarios for power system planning studies. 
3.3.1  The Procedure of Power System Reliability Assessment 
The procedure steps of power system reliability evaluation for this chapter is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.5 [1] and power system reliability index calculation agenda is 
expressed as following steps:  
1. Define and extract power system load and generation profiles from [1] and apply to the 
system. 
2. Initialize the load demand and PV generation profile characteristics.  
3. Determine reliability data for each power system component (transformers, power lines, 
busbars, etc.). 
4. Select randomly the system state based on non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation. 
5. Perform the power flow considering power balance with global voltage limits. 
6. Converge the computation, assess the system state with the system overloading and satisfy 
power flow. If not, go to step (4). 
7. Update statistics for the load curtailments of each sampled system state. 
8. Finally, use a globally known reliability indicator for power systems, Expected Energy Not 
Supplied (EENS), is estimated and reliability index is reported. 
The network topology of IEEE RTS79 [148] was utilized for this study. The network 
system topology is composed of 24 substations and 32 traditional generating units. The 




from [148]. The IEEE RTS79 reliability test system is slightly adjusted according to each case 
study and these changes are presented in the result of each case study.  
 
3.4 Case Studies and Analysis 
In order to demonstrate the effects of load demand curves and PV generation curves on 
power system reliability analysis, different case studies are examined with relevant scenarios 
in this chapter. These case studies do not only evaluate power curves of supply and demand, 
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but also evaluate their intermittent characteristics within the context of power system reliability 
evaluation. In this chapter, load flow analysis is carried out on DigSILENT platform using AC 
Newton-Raphson technique, and utilised load-generation profiles are modelled on MATLAB 
and then interfaced.  
Case study 1 assess the impact of different types of load demand with increasing nominal 
load demand of the power system exclusively. The case study 2 investigates intermittency 
impacts of PV power generation on power system reliability. Centralised and distributed PV 
power generation are applied on the IEEE RTS79 reliability test system. In case study 3, 
impacts of PV generating units’ installation capacity on the reliability performance is evaluated 
with different deployment methods. 
3.4.1 Case Study 1: Impact of Load Demand on Power System Reliability  
The aim of the case study 1 is to assess impacts of consumers’ load demand data on the 
power grid. The study 1 analyses the intermittency of load demand characteristics through the 
calculation of reliability indices of a power system. The linearised load demand and original 
load demand were applied on to 13 load buses of IEEE RTS79. These 13 load points were 
chosen randomly that selected in order to connect load demand of consumers. In order to 
perform a robust analysis, the original loads of the proposed power network were removed from 
13 load buses. Instead of base case load demands of them, 38 load demand clusters were 
implemented in each load bus. After the base case was simulated, the magnitude of the load 
was incremental in steps of the base load level in each scenario until reaching the maximum 
load scaling level of the power system. Comparison of the influence of linearised load demand 




As can be seen from Figure 3.6, the reliability indices show moderate growth in both 
linearised load demand and original load demand cases. The growth of EENS is started from 
the 1st load scaling factor until 7th load scaling factor. With increase steps on x axis of Figure 
3.6, the profile of linearised load demand has slightly associated with greater EENS values 
compared to original load demand profiles due to design of load profiles. Afterwards, the 
behaviour of EENS fluctuates until the maximum load capacity level and its value is reached 
almost 17 GWh/year in both cases. These fluctuations can be associated with the design error 
of linearised load profiles. Thus, the highest error between load demand curves is computed as 
1.33% [1].  
 As a result, two outcomes can be drawn from the results. First, the selection of load 
demand curves can play a key role in the robustness of reliability analysis. Second, a small 
intermittency on demand profiles of 6000 consumers can result in a considerable impact on the 
 




























EENS in parallel with the reliable operating status of power systems. This could mislead system 
operators on demand-generation balance scheduling and might increase the electricity cost due 
to the unavailability of cost-effective generators [1]. 
3.4.2 Case Study 2: Effects of PV Power Generation on Power System Reliability 
One of the objectives of the case study 2 is to investigate how intermittent PV generation 
affects power system reliability. In order to evaluate uncertainty impacts of PV power 
generation on the power system reliability analysis, linearised PV profile curves and original 
PV generation profile curves were implemented while considering two generation deployment 
methods (centralised and distributed generation) [1]. 
 
Substation 7, and substation 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 are chosen for the centralised and the distributed 
PV integration scenario nodes, respectively. The total active power load capacity of the IEEE 
RTS79 is as 2850 MW.  As a result, the nominal installed capacity of PV power generation is 
set approximately as 5 % of the total load capacity, which is 142 MW [1].  
 























To analyse the correlation between original PV generation and linearised PV generation, 
same generation profiles were used in both scenarios. The installed capacity of the PV 
generating unit is increased with 5% of the total load demand and this increment is expected to 
continue as far as the power system is within the voltage limits. Figure 3.7 presents EENS 
merits of the power network with the centralised implementation of PV generating unit. Figure 
3.7 reveals that there has been a sharp increase on EENS from the base case until 5% of installed 
capacity PV generation. The sharp increase on EENS is unexpected and EENS should not be 
escalated if there is an increment on power generation. It is due to the location of PV generator 
in the system. This result reveals that substation 7 has a critical importance for PV generator 
connections [1].  
When the installed capacity of PV generation is increased from 5% till 15%, EENS 
seems to be levelled off. In reality, EENS diminish steadily but, EENS varies with 0.001% - 
0.003% until reaching 15% of PV generating unit capacity. This reaction of EENS may be 
because there is no either new growth in load demand or need of generation that shows the 
generation capacity is adequate for the test system. It is also apparent from Figure 3.7 that 
centralised PV generation capacity is reached up to around 15 % generation capacity limit in 
both linearized and original PV generation profiles. Power system is expected to have a collapse 
in operation as a consequence of reaching centralised PV generation limits. Installed PV 
generation capacity for linearised PV generation reaches around 13.25 %. On the other hand, 
original PV generation capacity is limited with 11.9 % of base case capacity [1].  These PV 
generation limits appear because the test system reaches operational capacity limits. The 
realisation of different PV generation capacity limits is as a result of the disparity on the profile 




Similarly, Figure 3.8 shows that there has been a steep rise on EENS value from the 
base case PV generation till 5 % capacity level of PV generation due to the criticality of PV 
generator location.  Although PV generation capacity increases up to 25% of base case levels, 
EENS mainly seems to be remained constant according to Figure 3.8. In fact, EENS declines 
very slowly at the first until up to 20% of base case levels of PV generation and EENS changes 
with portion of 0.0012% -0.002 %. Following that, the decrease on EENS between 20% and 
25% of base case levels of PV generation can be seen more clearly and it is 0.1%. One reason 
why EENS has this reaction that the electricity generation is sufficient enough for local part of 
test system. It is declined owing to the topology of test system. Location of PV generating unit 
has been an important factor for EENS changes in this study [1].   
 






















3.4.3 Case Study 3: Impacts of Load Demand versus PV Installation Capacity on 
Power System Reliability   
The objective of the case study 3 is to investigate what the PV generation capacity limits 





Figure 3.9 Line charts of EENS for Centralised PV generation considering Load 














































As similar to the case study 1, the capacity of load also increases in the substations for case 
study 3. PV systems are integrated as centralised and decentralised. The results of case study 3 
for centralised integration scenario are shown in Figure 3.9.What is interesting in this scenario 
(in Figure 3.9) for the integration of centralised PV generation systems is that the general pattern 
of EENS has increased sharply resulting from the system topology (the criticality of bus 7). 
EENS has gradually declined stemming from new PV generators till reaching the capacity 
limits of their installation in the test system. In addition, both cases of PV generation profiles 
have behaved in a similar pattern, except PV integration capacity level ranges which ranged 
between 10 % and 15 %, resulting from the design of PV generation profiles. According to 
Figure 3.9-a, there has been a slight difference in between both PV generation profiles due to 
the volatility between generation profiles [1].  
With implementing maximum load scaling factor in Figure 3.9-a, the capacity limit of PV 
generating unit integration into the power grid is given 14.75 % and 13.15 % of the base case 
for linearised and original PV generation profiles, respectively (Table 3.1). As in Figure 3.9-b, 
the system installation capacity limits for linearized and original PV generation concepts are 
also 19.75 % and 17.5 % of base case capacity accordingly (Table 3.1). These variations mainly 
owing to the design error between PV generation profiles [1]. 
As a consequence, minimum load scaling factor is more favourable for implementing PV 
generators compared to maximum load scaling factor, and the location of load in the test system 
could be another influencing factor for the occurrence of higher penetration of PV generation 




Table 3.1 Comparison of linearised PV and original PV profiles on the system reliability [1] 

























Profile 96608.266 17.5 106725.494 13.15 
Furthermore, the results of distributed PV generation under maximum loading 
conditions are presented in Figure 3.10. Implemented PV generation capacity in each bus is 5 
% of nominal total load of the power grid for this scenario. The value of the reliability indicator 
(EENS) remained steady until the connection of the PV generator in bus 7.  It can be clearly 
seen in Figure 3.10 that EENS is significantly escalated when the PV generator is connected to 
bus 7.  This reaction of EENS can justify the criticality of the substation 7 and validates the 
reason of changes due to the topology of power system. EENS also varies between linearised 
and original PV generation profiles.  
   
 

























Although the variation of EENS is limited between the linearised and original PV 
generation profiles, linearised profiles can be advantageous when less volatility and complexity 
are necessity for the analysis [1]. 
3.4.4 Discussion  
This chapter presented the general effects of load demand profiles and PV power 
generation curves on power system reliability assessment without considering cyber-physical 
system integration. Most of the current researches on power system reliability are linked to the 
reliability of the system with data complexity, accuracy, efficiency and the computing time the 
analysis. When the load demand and generation profile curves have created with small number 
of data points, the calculation accuracy of reliability index can be reduced compared to actual 
load demand and generation models but, this approach can reduce the processing time of the 
assessment that can be effective to fast responses. On the other hand, the calculation accuracy 
of reliability index can be increased if the profiling is designed with large data points, though it 
can expand the level of data complexity and the processing time of the assessment. Thus, load 
demand and generation profile curves have a critical role to evaluate power system reliability. 
Case study 1 and 2 confirm that incorporating consumers’ and prosumers’ generalised 
pattern characteristics can be effective for power system reliability analysis due to the 
calculation accuracy. It can diminish the work load of computers with less data usage on power 
system analysis. Therefore, these might affect the processing time of power system analysis 
positively, when there is a high-level of work load on analysis. Not only the volatility features, 
but also the system topology and the location of PV generating units have a significant effect 




necessarily mean maximum load capacity can cause higher penetration levels of PV generating 
unit. The proposed scenarios also highlight that composite power system reliability analysis is 
sensitive to changes even if they are small changes in load demand and PV generation curves. 
Case study 3 demonstrates the impact of PV generation with different load conditions and 
presents power system generation capacity limits under different integration methods. 
Minimum load scaling factor is more promising for implementing PV generators compared to 
maximum load scaling factor. Furthermore, the loading conditions of power lines connected 
with bus 7 affects PV generation capacity limits. Critical buses have a key role in increasing 
PV penetration levels. This indicates also the importance of PV generating unit locations in 
power system reliability analysis. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the procedure of power system reliability analysis and is 
exemplifing with case studies that show the impact of  PV generation and load demand curves 
on power system reliability. Case studies point out that the details of demand and generation 
curves play a vital role on power system reliability assessment. They could affect the processing 
time of the analysis as well as the accuracy of the analysis.   
However, these case studies do not consider the analysis of cyber-physical system 
integration and its impacts on power system reliability, which are going to be evaluated in the 





Chapter 4: Power System Reliability Analysis with 
Cyber-Physical Interactive Operations of PV 
Systems 
4.1 Introduction 
Information and communication technologies (ICT’s) are revolutionising the way that 
power grid systems work, moving from conventional power applications toward intelligent and 
carbon-free technologies. There is no doubt that ICTs’ interactivity can affect the performance 
of power systems. Since the interactions of traditional power systems with ICTs have been 
limited, classic power system reliability studies have not considered the effects and 
performance of ICTs, and these should be taken in the evaluations.    
The main objective of this chapter is to evaluate power system reliability with cyber-
physical interactive operations of PV generating units. Moreover, this chapter was designed to 
investigate the effects of the integration of cyber-physical systems in power grids. In order to 
do so, an analysis framework for the availability and unavailability of the ICTs’ components is 
proposed. Relevant case studies are presented by performing the integrated environment of the 
cyber-physical system in the IEEE RTS79 and Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS).   
Some sections of this chapter are prepared from the reference [3]. This publication’s case 
studies and reliability evaluation framework have been produced from the research in this 




system reliability evaluation, the framework of the cyber-physical system interactive 
operations, related simulations and case studies. 
 This chapter is structured with the following sections. Relevant research work related 
to cyber-physical system operations is given with the research problem in subsection 4.1.1. In 
section 4.2, the mathematical framework of cyber-physical interactive operations considering 
PV generation systems is proposed with the power system reliability procedure. In section 4.3, 
the cyber-physical system interactive operation of PV systems is exemplified using case studies 
and their results are analysed. Following this, section 4.4 is a summary of the research work 
that has been presented in this chapter. 
4.1.1 Status Quo of the Research Problem 
Power system reliability analysis is the heart of the understanding of power system 
planning and operational performances. One of the dominant generation technologies of the 
energy sector, low-carbon technologies such as solar PV, is reshaping power grids. The 
deployment plan of PV technologies into power networks needs a detailed reliability evaluation 
to sustain a secure and reliable power delivery. It is mentioned in Chapter 2 that the existing 
literature on PV powered system reliability is extensive and focuses particularly on component-
based reliability; however, there is limited involvement of the impacts of the cyber-physical 
systems with PV generating units.  
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), cyber-physical 
systems (CPS) can be defined as intelligent systems that consist of structured interactive 
operational networks of physical and computing elements [149].With the two-way 




and more flexible. However, cyber-physical systems can also bring additional vulnerabilities 
resulting from increasing level of digital complexity with attack surfaces in power systems. 
There is a relatively small body of literature that is concerned with cyber threats on PV 
power generation systems [150-152] and there is no direct consideration of the evaluation of 
power system reliability with cyber-physical system operation of PV systems. Moreover, there 
have not been any real cases reported where cyber-attacks have affected PV generating units. 
However, these studies [150-152] have demonstrated that cyber-attacks are expected to impact 
on the reliability performance of the PV generation systems in the power grid.  
In [152], it is presented that some components of PV power plants are more likely to be 
exposed to cyber malfunctions and threats. The map of cyber-physical system risk management 
for PV power generating unit is presented according to PV system components and 
stakeholders. Reference [152] also  analyses vulnerabilities and attack vectors related to PV 
power generation. It highlights that the specific subsystems of PV plant are vulnerable to cyber-
attacks within the information security triad (integrity, confidentiality and availability)[152]. 
However, this study remains unfulfilled because of limited analysis on quantification of system 
vulnerabilities, and lack of numerical explanations of threat effects.  
On the other hand, Liu et al. have quantified the PV system’s performance, overall 
system’s risk levels and monetary risks when there are cyber-physical incidents in a real micro-
grid test case. The effects of cyber-attacks on the operation and controls of PV systems are also 
introduced with their operational management characteristics and under related communication 
protocols. Although it incorporates cyber-operational failures of the micro grid, the study does 




As the importance of communication protocols is noted in [151], there is a universal 
standard, IEC 61850, which defines core communication protocols for electric power system 
automation. This standardises the communication road map of low-carbon technologies, their 
related components and protocols during power system operations.[153] 
According to [150], IEC 61850 is greatly anticipated to dominate communication services 
of distributed energy resources, especially PV generating units. In order to analyse the potential 
capability of cyber-attacks on PV inverters, this research study was performed with a test bed 
utilizing real PV components and communication tools. It is clearly shown that cyber-attacks 
can intrude and diminish the performance and output of PV generation. In addition, it is 
interesting that a cyber-attack was able to shut down the PV system operation without the 
knowledge of SCADA operations. It highlights the importance of IEC 61850 for PV generation 
systems [150]. 
As can be clearly seen in previously published literature [150-152], there is a limited 
consideration on power system reliability assessments of PV systems under cyber-physical 
operations. The main question of this chapter is how would all stakeholders of DERs be affected 
by cyber-malfunction and cyber-intruders in context of power system reliability? 
4.2 The Mathematical Framework of Cyber-Physical Interactive 
Operations Considering PV Generating Units 
One of the important aspects of power system adequacy analysis for any system is to 




presents the reliability concept methodology of cyber-physical interactive operation of PV 
generation systems considering its network model. 
4.2.1 Reliability Analysis Procedure of PV Systems 
Power systems are composed of a great deal of sub-units and systems that contain power 
generation components and power delivery elements connected with serial, parallel or meshed 
network arrangements. Similarly, PV generation units also include these network 
 




configurations according to its deployment location and technological constraints. In order to 
perform a solid reliability analysis of PV generation units in power grid, the network 
configurations of PV systems with its components as a serial or parallel has pivotal functions. 
Thus, the network configuration of PV generation units is presented as in Figure 4.1 [3]. 
As a generic method, a two-state Markov chain model is implemented in failure process 
for this study. The operation states of the PV system components are defined as operating (Up) 
and non-operating (Down). The operation process can be clearly seen in Figure 4.2. 
 
 The PV system network configuration is arranged with three sub-divisions as in Figure 
4.1. The 1st sub-division consists of a PV panel, a micro-inverter, and a fuse as a serial 
configured unit. Also, this division represents a PV string. There are n-independent numbers of 
parallel strings that are linked with n-independent of 2nd sub-divisions. The 2nd sub-division is 
composed of a charge controller with a battery bank as a serial. Serially connected these two 
sub-divisions are also connected to 3rd sub-division in a series order. It comprises of cyber-









 ⟹ 𝜆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 𝜇𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 × 𝑃𝑓 × 𝑃𝑟
−1 (4.1) 
 





 In order to compute composite failure and repair rates of sub-divisions of PV generating 
unit, the balance equation (4.1) is produced from [26], and availability (A) and unavailability 
(U) indices of the system are expressed with (𝜆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚, 𝜇𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚) and (𝑃𝑓 , 𝑃𝑟) that represent 
failure-repair rates of the system and the failure-repair state probabilities of the system 
















          𝑡: 1,2,3, … , 𝑛 
(4.2) 
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For computing the composite failure and repair rates of 1st string as serially configured, 
4.2 - 4.5 equations are utilized. Equations 4.2 and 4.3 calculate the failure-repair state 
probabilities of the PV string (𝑃𝑓𝑀𝐼 , 𝑃𝑟𝑀𝐼) with the failure-repair rates of PV panel 
(𝜆𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑡 , 𝜇𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑡 ) micro-inverter (𝜆𝑀𝐼 , 𝜇𝑀𝐼) and fuse (𝜆𝐹 , 𝜇𝐹). Given failure-repair rates of 
components and the state probabilities, the failure and repair rates of 1st string (𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝐼 ,𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝐼 ) 
are calculated with equations 4.4 - 4.5 [3]. 
𝑃𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔






































Before calculation of composite failure and repair rate of 2nd sub-division, n-
independent parallel strings are included into calculation of composite failure and repair rate of 
1st sub-division by equations 4.6 - 4.9. (𝑃𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑀𝐼 , 𝑃𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑀𝐼 ) and (𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑀𝐼 , 𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑀𝐼 ) which represent 
the failure-repair state probabilities of n-independent PV strings and the failure-repair rates of 







































𝜆𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟, 𝜇𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 (4.14) 
As previously described, 2nd sub-division of PV generating units consists of storages 
that include battery banks and charge controllers. ( 𝜆𝐵𝐵𝑡 , 𝜇𝐵𝐵𝑡) and (𝜆𝐶𝐶𝑡 , 𝜇𝐶𝐶𝑡) denote the 
failure-repair rates of a battery bank and a charge controller, respectively. Equations 4.10 and 
4.11 compute the failure-repair state probabilities of the storage units. The failure and repair 




 The 3rd sub-division includes the cyber physical component of a PV generating unit and 
its failure and repair rates (𝜆𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 , 𝜇𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟) are used in composite reliability for a PV generating 
unit. By utilizing composite failure-repair rates of PV generating system’s sub-divisions and 
Markov chain state transition for the PV generating unit is developed as in Figure 4.3.  
 
4.2.2 Reliability Analysis Procedure of Cyber-Physical Systems  
As previously highlighted, published research on the reliability of a PV system with 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) is limited. Failure-repair rates of many physical components 
 





have been assessed and they are publicly available for any system’s reliability evaluation. 
Because CPS is comprised of not only physical layers but also virtual layers, the interaction of 
CPS’s virtual layers with its physical part can affect the reliability of the system operations. 
Due to data availability of failure-repair rates of CPS components and their calculation 
challenges, the evaluation of the composite power system reliability becomes a more 
challenging task. In addition, it needs to be indicated that the estimation of failure-repair rates 
of CPS and the statistical detection procedure of cyber-attacks are vital to assess CPS’s 
interaction with PV systems because of CPS’s stochastic nature. Thus, the working principle of 
CPSs’ components is considered with a two-state unit approach as operating and non-operating 
states in order to increase its applicability into reliability-risk analysis concepts [154] [3]. 
Previous studies suggests that not all cyber-intrusions with different intensity can lead 
to a failure in a power network, thereby cyber incidents are accepted as an uncommon event 
[155]. In order to estimate failures of a cyber-physical system in a pool of a fixed number of 
events, the Poisson random number generator is utilized due to its rare event characteristics 
[155]. Utilization of Poisson distribution in a rare event is justified by Palm - Khintchine 
theorem and it states that events with small intensity level follow the pattern of a Poisson 
process [155]. Thus, this chapter considers cyber incidents and related threats as rare events [3]. 
General assumptions are made for the availability simulation of CPS. These are as 
following: 1-The traditional power system is not compromised of any defensive mechanism for 
cyber-intrusions and there is no partially-operating rule for CPS’s cyber layer; 2-The 
permeability criteria of the cyber layer in the power grid is constant and memoryless; 3-The 
iteration number of availability simulation and the number of randomly generated cyber-attacks 




of cyber-intrusion to the cyber layer of the CPS; 5-The number of successful intrusions can be 
calculated only if comparison of attack intensity and the cyber layer of CPS’s permeability 
criteria can be made [3]. In order to calculate the availability indicator of CPS, a framework is 
created as in Figure 4.4 by the help of the studies in [156, 157]. The main objective of the 
availability framework of CPS is to estimate availability-unavailability rates of CPS. Proposed 
generic electric sector failure scenarios related to cyber threats by National Electric Sector 
Cybersecurity Organization Resource (NESCOR) are analysed with reference [156]. According 
to information security, cyber threats are categorised into three main classes in order to calculate 
their impacts on a power grid [156].  
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Confidentiality can be referred that the state of cyber-intrusion to access data and take 
confidential information or data without any permission or authorization of operators. As a 
result of the cyber-intrusion, the power grid has still not experienced any destruction or damage 
[3].  
Integrity can be defined as cyber-intruder changes to the information and modifications 
to the private data in a power grid. However, there are no interruptions to service or disruptions 
in power grid operations [3]. 
Availability can be described as a system or infrastructure which is able to sustain its 
standard operations without any damage and destruction. Power network outages may be 
generated by the lack of availability of the system [3].  
Due to the lack of availability of the system can cause system outages in context of a 
power grid, the availability analysis for CPS is the main focus of this framework. Unavailability 
of the system is described as power system outages at a high level [156]. In this manner, large 
scale power outages are generated as result of the effects of a high intensity level cyber intrusion 
[156]. So as to compute the availability ratio of CPS, the permeability-intensity criteria of the 
cyber layer of the CPS needs to be obtained, which may assist to identify the severity level of 
a cyber-intrusion that may result in the system outage. It is also assumed that cyber-intrusions 
with different severity levels, which are classified with different attack configuration groups 
(confidentiality, integrity and availability), can affect the operation status of the system. Cyber-
attack is successfully intruded into the system only if the intensity level of cyber-intrusion meet 
the limit criteria of the permeability-intensity of the cyber layer of the system. Hence, if the 




system contingency. For this mathematical framework of the CPS availability analysis, the limit 
criteria of the permeability-intensity of the cyber layer of the system is obtained as 0.88 [156]. 
This framework with the limit criteria estimates the contingency number of CPS considering 
the strength of cyber-intrusions and their asynchronous characteristics [3].  
After the calculation framework for the availability of CPS as in Figure 4.4, the 
calculation procedure of the failure-repair rate of CPS is expressed as the following stages [3]: 
I. Set initial counter states of the failure detection of the CPS and the intensity ratio of the 
cyber-intrusion. 
II. Specify the total number of cyber-intrusions in the simulation. 
III. Determine an intensity ratio of the cyber-intrusion with a random selection. 
IV. According to the intensity ratio of the cyber-intrusion, select a Poisson random number 
for arrival level of cyber-intrusion. 
V. Examine the permeability-intensity criteria of the cyber-intrusion on the cyber layer of 
the CPS. If the arrival level of cyber-intrusion is higher than the criteria, increase the 
contingency number of the CPS. 
VI. Follow the availability process stages of CPS until the fulfilling the number of cyber-
intrusions in the simulation. 
VII. Calculate the availability rate of the CPS. 
VIII. In order to perform the sensitivity analysis on the repair rate of CPS, select a CPS repair 
rate strategy (low, medium, and high mean recovery time). 
IX. According selected repair-time strategy of CPS, time to repair (TTR) of CPS is calculated 






= 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 (𝑇𝑇𝑅) (4.15) 
 Where 𝜇𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 and TTR represent the repair rate of the CPS for a year and the time to 
repair of the CPS, respectively. 
X. Finally, the failure rate of the CPS (𝜆𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟) is estimated by the following formula (4.16) 
and it is re-designed from [158]. The availability of the CPS is described as 𝐴, which is 
generated by the availability framework. 
𝜆𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 =




4.2.3 The Procedure of Composite Power System Reliability Evaluation  
One of the objectives of power system reliability studies is to investigate the capacity 
limits of the power system to fulfil the demand of consumers within a certain amount of time. 
The standard procedure of composite power system reliability evaluation incorporating with 
availability framework of the CPS is presented as follows: 
i. Model and determine the critical elements of PV powered systems, its generation output and 
load demand of each busbar. 
ii. Find out and determine failure and repair rates of power system components as well as the 
components of the PV generating unit. 
iii. By means of the repair time strategy for the CPS and the calculation of CPS’s availability, 
all failure-repair rates of subdivisions of PV generating unit can be calculated. Calculated 
values of the failure-repair rates are implemented into the presented Markov chain transition 




iv. Generate a random sample of the state of the PV generating unit with CPS. 
v. Initialize power equilibrium in the test system and scrutinize standard voltage boundaries 
during the power flow analysis. 
vi. Perform power flow analysis with 10000 iterations and compute the Expected Demand Not 






   (4.17) 
The unit of EDNS is subject to GW, where Si represents system state i; Li describes load 
curtailment in system state i; pi denotes the system state probability.    
vii. In the final step, Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) can be calculated by following the 





EENS L p EDNS

      (4.18) 
Figure 4.5 describes the procedure of the reliability assessment framework of PV 
generating units with CPS. The procedure is divided into two parts. The first part of the 
procedure determines the failure-repair rates of CPS and the state probabilities of the proposed 
Markov model, which are calculated by MATLAB. Calculated data from the simulation of the 
first part is fed into an eight-state Markovian model in order to determine the state probabilities 
of a composite PV generating unit subroutine in DIgSILENT (StoGen) for the second part of 
the procedure [159]. StoGen is a component of a multi-state stochastic power generation model 
incorporating with each PV powered generator (ElmGenstat). In order to estimate EDNS and 




flow routine with the data of 8-state PV system probabilities and availabilities calculated from 
the first part of the simulation [3].  
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Figure 4.5 The procedure of the reliability assessment framework of PV generating 





4.3 Case Studies and Results Analysis 
4.3.1 The Topology of Reliability Test Systems and Utilized Data for Case Studies   
This section of the chapter introduces utilized test systems with their modifications and 
implemented reliability data of power system components for case studies. In addition, 
extended version of buses are used for reliability test systems and this is demonstrated with its 
components. 
4.3.1.1 Information and Communication Technology Extension for Busbar Protection 
The CPS operations of power networks have been involved as a secondary part of power 
systems in power system assessments. Previously proposed reliability test systems in the 
literature did not integrate the components of cyber-physical systems. Thus far, there are 
limitations on available standard test systems to assess the operation effects of cyber-physical 
systems on power grids. On the other hand, a recently published study [160] proposes a 
protection mechanism to apply IEC 61850 standard for the protection of substations. 
Incorporating with this mechanism, the reliability test systems (RBTS and IEEE RTS79) are 
extended with ICT components for proposed case studies in this chapter. The architecture of 
the protection system in substations is modelled as in [15]. The detailed architecture of the 
protection system of a substation is presented in Figure 4.6-a) with exemplifying the Bus 3 in 
the IEEE RTS79. The topology conventional version and extended version of IEEE RTS79 are 




Because of the complexity and variety of CPS components, it is difficult to extend all 







































Figure 4.6 a) An example of the detailed architecture of the substation with ICT extension, 







of IEEE RTS79 are only modified with an interdependent CPS that are comprised of a merging 
unit (MU), ethernet switch (ES) and line protection panel as in Figure 4.6. All these elements 
of an ICT system in the specified terminals are connected to each other serially. This 
configuration of the ICT protection system is implemented only in the extended version of IEEE 
RTS79 for relevant case studies. The conventional IEEE RTS79 is composed of 24 buses and 
32 traditional generators with the system peak load demand of 2850 MW. Its’ related topology 
with parameters are obtained from [148] [3]. 
PV generating units are implemented into both conventional and extended versions of 
IEEE RTS79 with either centralised or decentralised connections. Centralised PV generating 
units are only applied into busbar 9 for specified case studies of IEEE RTS79 by cause of its 
critical characteristics. In other respects, decentralised PV generating units are implemented 
into busbar 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10 for relevant case studies. The nominal capacity of a PV generating 
unit at a consumer level is accepted as 4 kW and the total number of consumers in IEEE RTS79 
is assumed as 949,994. Remain reliability parameters for case studies are obtained from [161, 
162] [3]. 
4.3.1.2 The RBTS extended with Information and Communication Technology 
Configurations and Utilized Reliability Data for Case Studies 
In order to examine the effect of CPS in distribution systems, the Roy Billinton Test 
System (RBTS) is utilized in the analysis of power system reliability. The RBTS is comprised 
of 9 transmission lines, 6 main terminals and 230 kV, 138 kV, 33 kV, 11 kV and 400 V buses 
are classified as voltage levels in the test system. The nominal peak load demand and peak 




topology of ICT extended version of the RBTS and conventional version of the RBTS are 
extended to apply to PV generating units with centralised and decentralised integration modes 
for specified case studies. Terminal 3 of the RBTS is used for a centralised PV generation 
integration mode. On the other hand, terminal 3, 4, 5 and 6 are used for a decentralised 
integration mode of PV generating units. PV generating units are integrated into 11 kV voltage 
levels. The nominal capacity of PV generating unit at a consumer level is accepted as 4 kW and 
total number of consumers in the RBTS is assumed as 18,308. Remaining reliability parameter 
data for case studies are obtained from [2, 161, 162]. ICT extended version of terminals of the 
RBTS are designed to be similar to those used in the ICT extended version of terminals of the 



































IEEE RTS79. Figure 4.7  describes schematic diagram of the RBTS with PV systems and ICT 
extended version [3].  
In order to demonstrate the impact of CPS on power system reliability, the failure rate 
and repair times of CPS needs to be calculated or obtained. Although there is no available data 
for repair times of CPS which can be used for reliability analysis, the failure rates of CPS cannot 
be calculated without the assumption of the repair times of CPS. With respect to [163], 23% of 
the UK companies recovered from cyber-intrusions within less than a day. 13 % of business 
firms affected by cyber-attacks returned to normal working conditions in less than a week. 
Almost 3 % of companies influenced by cyber-attacks repaired their system in either from a 
week to a month or beyond [163]. As a reference point, survey [163] shows that recovery time 
ranges from hours to months. For this chapter, the repair times of CPS are estimated as 15, 30 
and 60 hours. These repair times are identified by low to high level harmful levels of cyber-
intrusions on a power grid. Relevant repair times with computed failure rates and the reliability 
data of PV generating units with ICT components are given in the following Table 4.1 [3]. 
Table 4.1 Reliability data for PV system, ICT components and CPS repair time strategies[3] 
PV System and ICT 
Components 
Failure rate Repair time 
PV panel 1.14×10-6 0.0209 (48h) 
Micro-inverter 0.05 0.05 (20h) 
Charge-controller 0.125 0.1 (10h) 
Battery bank 0.00702 0.0825 (12.11h) 
Fuse 0.00137 0.05 (20h) 
Merging unit 0.02 8h 
Ethernet switch 0.01 8h 
Protection panel 0.02 8h 
Repair Strategy Failure rate Repair time 
High Repair Time 0.019 0.016 (60h) 
Medium Repair Time 0.0097 0.033 (30h) 




4.3.2 Case Study 1: Large-scale of PV Generating Unit Integration on Transmission 
System   
The objective of case study 1 is to describe the effects of recovery time strategies of the 
CPS on the reliability of the power systems when the penetration level of PV generating units 
is increased.  
 






Figure 4.8 Graphs of EENS changes in IEEE RTS79 with centralised PV generating units-
a) EENS for centralised PV generating units’ integration in IEEE RTS79, b) EENS for 














































IEEE RTS79 are utilized with centralised PV generating unit modification. Figure 4.8 describes 
EENS changes in IEEE RTS79 with centralised PV generating unit integration considering 
Figure 4.8-a) IEEE RTS79 without ICT extensions and Figure 4.8-b) IEEE RTS79 with ICT 
extensions. Similarly, Figure 4.9 demonstrates EENS changes in IEEE RTS79 with 
decentralised PV generating unit integration considering Figure 4.9-a) IEEE RTS79 without 
ICT extensions and Figure 4.9-b) IEEE RTS79 with ICT extensions. The installed capacity 
level of PV generating units ranges from 0% (base case) to 50% of the base case level for both 
centralised and decentralised cases [3].  
 Both Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 represents an increase in PV powered generation that 
diminishes the EENS of the power network due to the large-scale penetration level of the PV 
generation. As described with all the case studies of PV generating units in both Figure 4.8 and 
Figure 4.9, the EENS index of each case study is adversely affected by the integration of the 
CPS. When there is an increment on the capacity level of the PV generating unit with CPS, the 
index of EENS escalates all of a sudden. Despite this there is a significant growth in between 
CPS’s repair times, the EENS index of the PV generating unit with CPS has higher value 
compared to the base case of the PV generating unit in all repair scenarios. It can be clearly 
seen from both Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 that the EENS index has linearly declined in all 
scenarios if the capacity level of PV generation is linearly raised. In particular, there is a steep 
increase on EENS in comparison of the PV generating unit case scenarios of 40% with 50% 
capacity levels and the case scenarios of 10%, 20%, and 30% capacity levels. The cause of the 
variation on the rise of EENS is owing to the diversification in the failure-repair rates of PV 
generating units. Also, it is as a result of a systematic variation of the PV generating unit’s 





Nevertheless, if the PV generating unit passes 30% capacity level, the EENS is limited 
by the repair time of the CPS with its lowest point. From the point of view of economics, it may 
be more advantageous to choose a low repair time strategy in order to diminish the effect of 
labour cost during the recovery. For this reason the EENS index in case study 1, the centralised 
PV generating unit is a slightly more secure option to invest in compared to a decentralised PV 
generating unit even if there is a proposed CPS due to the intact operation of CPS compared 






Figure 4.9 Graphs of EENS changes in IEEE RTS79 with decentralised PV generating 
units- a) EENS for decentralised PV generating units’ integration in IEEE RTS79, b) EENS 















































RTS79 in both Figure 4.8-b) and Figure 4.9-b), there are steep falls in the EENS index when 
the integration of a PV generating unit is as either centralised or decentralised cases. 
Comparison of EENS changes in between ‘with and without’ ICT extension of transmission 
systems, varies between 0.1% and 1.4% on the EENS index when considering both 
decentralised and centralised cases because of the protection features of ICT elements. It can 
be observed that the effect of ICT elements in power system reliability within the medium and 
high repair time of CPS case scenarios if the installed capacity level of PV generating unit is 
40% and 50% of the base case [3]. 
4.3.3 Case Study 2: Comparison of PV and synchronous generator for IEEE RTS79 
The purpose of case study 2 is to compare the integration of conventional generation against 
PV generation systems for understanding the reaction of power grid and sensitivity of different 
CPS repair time scenarios. Case study 2 adopts a procedure that increases the capacity level of 
PV generating unit with a 5 MW; decreases the capacity level of conventional generation of 
slack bus (bus 13) of IEEE RTS79 with a 5 MW at the same time. This strategy is implemented 
into centralised and decentralised generating units taking into consideration ‘with and without’ 
ICT extension of substations, and it is continued until it reaches 25 MW PV generation capacity, 
to observe the effects on EENS. It can be clearly seen from Figure 4.10-a) and Figure 4.11-a) 
that a rise in PV generation decreases EENS index when considering the strategies of the base 
case, Low and Medium repair time. What stands out in the Figure 4.10-a) is that the system 
reliability is improved with Low and Medium repair time strategies compared to the base case 





In addition, the sudden variation of EENS is more prominent with an increment in the 
penetration of decentralised PV generating unit as shown in Figure 4.11-a). There is a unique 
variation in this scenario even if PV generation reaches 5 MW in the scenario of the high repair 
time. Although the mean time failure rate of a PV generating unit is higher than the conventional 





Figure 4.10 EENS changes in centralised PV generation with different topology features 
[3], a) Centralised PV generating units’ integration in IEEE RTS79, b) Centralised PV 



















































bus 13. However, it is not always true that PV generating units are more reliable than 
conventional generating units. In this case, there can be three reasons that cause an apparent 
decrease on the EENS, which are the topology of the test system, the integration location of the 
PV generating unit and the intermittent nature of the PV generating unit. Moreover, the sudden 
variation on EENS with different repair time strategies of PV generating units may be stemming 
from either the availability of and the intermittency effect of the PV generating units or the 
location of the PV generating unit in the power grid [3]. 
Figure 4.10-b) and Figure 4.11-b) show that the ICT extended version of substations 
have positive effects on the system reliability compared to their traditional version. It can 
considerably diminish EENS when considering the medium and high-level recovery-time 
scenarios of CPS for PV systems.  ICT protection of the substations improves the system 
reliability resulting from a reduction of EENS between 0.1% and 0.5% compared with the 
traditional version of IEEE RTS79; excluding 25MW centralised PV generating unit with a 
high recovery time strategy as in Figure 4.10. When the capacity of the PV generating unit 
reaches up to 25 MW, the EENS is decreased with the medium and high-level recovery-time 
scenarios of CPS. In the angle of CPS scenarios, the threshold point of the PV generating unit 
capacity for the test system might vary between 20 and 25 MW in both Figure 4.10 and Figure 
4.11 [3].  
In order to investigate the root cause of a discovered sudden changes as shown in case 
study 2, two additional case studies were performed which focused on the power system 





4.3.4 Case Study 3: Impact of power network topology on system reliability in IEEE 
RTS79 
Case study 3 aims to explore the root causes of unforeseen EENS changes to PV 
generating units as previously observed in case study 1 and 2. The first step of the procedure 





Figure 4.11 EENS changes in decentralised PV generation with different topology 
features- a) Decentralised PV generating units’ integration in IEEE RTS79 b) 



















































synchronous generating unit with same capacity into the bus 9. The second step is similar to the 
procedure of case study 2 that an increase on generation at bus 9 will decrease an equal amount 
of generation capacity from the generator of bus 13 (slack bus).  
  
If the outcome from this procedure is similar to the case of PV generating units, then the 
outcome indicates that the sudden changes of EENS are because of the topology of the power 





Figure 4.12 Comparison of EENS variation considering different generating units in Bus 







































EENS are because of the intermittent nature of the PV generating units. Synchronous generating 
unit capacity changes from 0 MW to 25 MW as executed in the case study 2. Figure 4.12 
demonstrates that the results of the EENS index with synchronous generating units are almost 
the same as compared to PV generating units taking into account all the different repair-time 
strategies of CPS. However, small changes between both case scenarios can be linked with the 
intermittent feature of the PV generating unit’s output. Thus, the sudden variations of the EENS 
index as highlighted in case study 2 are affected by the location of PV generating units.The 
EENS index varies between 0.008% and 1.2% compared to the base case scenario due to 
intermittent characteristics of PV generating units. It can be seen from comparison of PV and 
synchronous generating units with 20MW generating capacity considering high repair time 
strategy of CPS that at its highest, changes within the EENS index reach 1.2 %. Also, a 20 MW 
PV generating unit capacity has a minimal intermittent effect on the EENS index when 
compared to the base case with 0.008%. Therefore,  when considering the intermittent 
conditions of the PV generating unit, a 20 MW PV generating unit capacity with medium repair-
time strategy is the most feasible scenario for this terminal [3]. 
4.3.5 Case Study 4: Contingency Analysis 
The contingency analysis of a power system is a part of comprehensive reliability evaluation of 
power systems. In order to examine the security analysis, it is important to carry out 
contingency analysis for high to low probable failures. The purpose of case study 4 is to perform 
the contingency analysis on IEEE RTS79 considering PV generating units with other 
components and to investigate what is the security margin limit of the test system during the 
integration of PV generation in both centralised and decentralised case scenarios. Single (N-1) 




performance considering the system voltage and loading limits. After implementing stochastic 
contingencies, terminal 6, transformer 3, 4 and 5 are investigated being as critical elements of 
the IEEE RTS79 when integrating PV generating units. Due to the highest level of voltage 
violation in the power network, terminal 6 is chosen for security testimony during both 
centralised and decentralised PV generating unit integrations. 


























5  1.012 1.012 5  98.0 97.5 
10  1.021 1.047 10  96.5 96.1 
14  1.043 1.049 15  95.0 94.8 
15  1.045 1.053 20  93.6 94.6 
20  1.048 1.057 25  92.1 93.7 
24  1.049 1.058 *** *** *** 













Transformer 5 Transformer 5 Transformer 4 Transformer 4 












5  95.4 95.6 5  87.9 87.5 
10  94.5 94.7 10  87.8 87.0 
15  93.6 93.7 15  87.6 86.6 
20  92.7 92.7 20  87.5 85.4 
25  91.8 91.7 25  87.4 84.7 
Table 4.2 represents contingency analysis for the critical components of the network. 
According to the analysis,  centralised and decentralised PV integration reach to the system 
voltage violation limits  with 24 MW and 14 MW  capacity levels, respectively. When the 
capacity of PV generating units is to reach a limit, there is a high risk of cascade collapse due 




must be considered during the power system operation and planning phases for this test system, 
in particular transformer 3. Even if the PV generating unit capacity is increased up to 25 MW 
for both integration scenarious, transformer 3 wouldstill overload and it needs to be carefully 
assessed by operators [3].        
4.3.6 Case Study 5: Large-scale PV Generating Unit Integration on a Distribution 
System   
Case study 5 demonstrates the effects of a PV generating unit capacity with the 
integration of CPS. The case also evaluates distribution system reliability considering different 
repair time strategies of CPS when increasing PV generation capacity levels. The procedure is 
applied same as in the case study 1. As might be expected that RBTS should behave differently 
than IEEE RTS79 because of their differing complexity levels and the differing structural 
details between them. The reliability assessment is performed with centralised and 
decentralised PV integration considering with the ICT extended version of the RBTS and 
original version of the RBTS. The capacity level of the PV generating unit is lifted from 0% to 
20 % of the base case of load demand capacity gradually. Figure 4.13 demonstrates that there 
are reductions on EENS index of the RBTS in all case scenarios compared with base case 
scenarios while the capacity of the PV generating units is increased. This implies that the 
integration of PV generating units with CPS brings a backlash effect on the power system 
reliability [3]. 
With an increment in PV generating unit capacity with CPS, EENS changes abruptly. 
There are different behaving of EENS index in the case study 5 compared to the case study 1. 




reliability is not constantly decreasing when considering with CPS repair-time strategy 
scenarios. A possible explanation for this behaviour might be that the RBTS is comparatively 
smaller and more complex than IEEE RTS79. In addition, the variation of EENS in small test 
systems may be smoothly observed compared to large test system.  
 
As seen from both Figure 4.13-a) and Figure 4.13-c), there are adverse impacts on EENS 
variations considering an increase on PV generation capacity level in both low and medium 
repair time of CPS scenarios. Nevertheless, EENS escalates in tandem with PV generation 
capacity level in the scenario of the high repair time strategy of CPS. Even if the increment of 
    
a)                                                             c) 
    
b)                                                             d) 
Figure 4.13 Graphs of EENS changes in RBTS with PV generating unit integrations- a) 
Centralised PV generating units’ integration in RBTS, b) Centralised PV generating units’ 
integration in RBTS with ICT extensions, c) Decentralised PV generating units’ integration 































































































PV generating unit capacity level reaches to 20 MW, EENS index of the RBTS with high repair 
time strategy nearly reaches to base case levels. Figure 4.13-b) and Figure 4.13-d) present the 
EENS variations of ICT extended version of the RBTS considering centralised and 
decentralised PV generating unit integrations. There are similarities between Figure 4.13-b) and 
Figure 4.13-d) that even if there are integration effects of CPS, the system reliability is 
positively impacted by the ICT extension of the RBTS. As a result, the EENS of the ICT 
extension of RBTS is enhanced with between 13% and 25% of base case levels. This is a prove 
of the importance of ICT protection extension in substations [3]. 
4.3.7   Case Study 6: Comparison of PV and synchronous generator for RBTS  
  The case study 6 set out to compare the integration of conventional generation against 
PV generating units for understanding the reaction of distribution test system and, additionally 
to examine the impact of different CPS repair time scenarios. As similar to case study 2, the 
procedure of case study 6 is to increase PV generating unit capacity level, and decrease the 
capacity level of synchronous generation from the slack bus (bus 1) of the RBTS at the same 
time. Centralised and decentralised PV generating units with CPS are also considered under 
ICT protection extension schemes for substations. The capacity limit of PV generation ranges 
between 0 MW and 40 MW with increasing 10 MW intervals in this case study. Terminal 3, 
and terminal 3, 4, 5 and 6 are utilized for centralised integration and decentralised integration 
case scenarios, respectively. The topology of utilized test system is shown in Figure 4.7. The 
results are described in Figure 4.14 that the EENS of all the scenarios with CPS is less than the 
EENS of the base cases when PV generating capacity level increases. It is expected outcome 
when PV generation is escalated. As seen in Figure 4.14, EENS of the RBTS pursues a different 




repair time, it can be observed in Figure 4.14-a) and Figure 4.14-b) that there are declining 
trends in the EENS compared to base case scenarios when the capacity level of the PV 
generating units is in step-increase [3]. 
 
Though, EENS with high repair time of CPS scenarios do not always follow declining trend. 
There are fluctuating trends in the EENS with high repair time of CPS scenarios in both 
centralised and decentralised integration of PV generating units (Figure 4.14-a) and Figure 
4.14-b)). With similar manner in case study 2, this trend of EENS is because of the PV 
generating unit location and loading conditions of the test system.  Unexpected pattern of the 
EENS of the RBTS is as result of the location of PV system integration as similarly seen in the 
     
a)                                                                   b) 
     
c) d) 
Figure 4.14 EENS changes in RBTS considering conventional and PV powered generation- 
a) Centralised PV generating units’ integration in RBTS, b) Decentralised PV generating 
units’ integration in RBTS, c) Centralised PV generating units’ integration in RBTS with 



























































































case study 2. This is the root cause of the fluctuating behaviour of EENS in the case of 
centralised and decentralised PV generating unit integration with CPS high repair time. Even 
though with this unique behaviour of the EENS with high repair time scenarios, EENS is 
associated with smaller values compared to base case scenarios. As seen from the comparative 
analysis of centralised and decentralised PV generating units in Figure 4.14, centralised PV 
generating unit integration in the RBTS outperforms compared to decentralised PV generating 
unit integration considering power system reliability improvement [3].  
In general, high penetration levels of PV generating units increase power system 
reliability unless if the generation of slack bus does not vary. It is possible that PV system with 
high repair time strategy of CPS can diminish overall system reliability in both test systems. 
ICT protection scheme of selected substations can mitigate negative effects on EENS. ICT 
protection scheme varies EENS between 0.1% and 1.4% compared conventional transmission 
system in both distributed and centralised cases. In addition, it might be more effective to select 
low repair time strategy for CPS to mitigate effect of labour cost during repair-time of PV 
generating units. Although the integration of distributed PV generation systems is more 
beneficial than centralised PV generation systems, the propagation of cyber-intrusions can be 
constrained by centralised PV connection nodes with substation protection elements. On the 
other hand, ICT protection scheme with RBTS diminishes EENS between 13% and 25% level 
compared to conventional RBTS. The complete approach reduces the complexity of the 
assessment process and shows the applicability of availability framework of CPS of PV 





This chapter introduces an innovative probabilistic framework for power system 
reliability assessment in order to analyse the integration of PV powered systems with CPS 
component interactions. A portion of the proposed model calculates the availability-
unavailability of the CPS’s interactions at PV generating unit nodes using homogeneous 
Markov Chain transitions. The entire concept diminishes the complexity of the evaluation 
procedure and ensures an innovative pathway to analyse system reliability in a holistic way. 
Presented case studies have shown that integration effects of PV generating units on power grid 
and varying cyber-threats were inconsistent with varying the capacity levels of PV generating 
units. Locations of PV generating units and their topology interactions are much more forceful 
on the effects in comparison to the intermittent characteristics of PV generating units. The 
propagation of cyber-intrusions can be restricted with centralised PV generating unit integration 
though the integration of decentralised PV generating units are more beneficial as oppose to the 
integration of centralised PV generating units. Therefore, the large-scale integration of PV 
generating units can be limited more when the operation of power systems comprises of ICT 






Chapter 5: Power System Reliability Analysis with 
Cyber-Physical Interactive Operation of Heat 
Pump Systems 
5.1 Introduction  
The energy sector is undergoing a period of transformation from a conventional power 
systems towards intelligent and carbon-free technologies. The importance of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) has inevitably been escalated in the power grid as a result 
of increasing penetration level of distributed generation and their capability of bidirectional 
communication. ICTs have become a critical part of a power grid infrastructure due to their 
essential features for the power system’s economic, reliable and secure operation. ICTs’ two-
way communication interactivity with distributed energy resources, such as with heat pumps 
integrated in a power system, may potentially increase the cyber-physical vulnerabilities of a 
power system. As a consequence, this can affect the reliability of power systems 
The aim of this chapter is to propose the model of heat pumps and then to assess the 
power system reliability with cyber-physical interactive operation. A composite system 
availability assessment framework with piecewise consideration of heat pump systems’ 
elements is proposed for reduce complexity of the reliability assessment. In addition, a new 
algorithm incorporating cyber intrusion process with heat pumps and cyber-physical interactive 





This chapter is structured with the following sections. Relevant research work related to 
cyber-attack modelling is explored considering smart grid applications, and the limitations of 
previous research work are discussed in subsection 5.1.1. In section 5.2, the mathematical 
framework of cyber-attack model and power system reliability model with heat pump (HP) 
systems are presented. In section 5.3, the power system reliability evaluation with cyber-
intrusion on HP systems is exemplified by case studies and then their results are analysed and 
discussed. Following this, section 5.4 is a summary of the research work that has been presented 
in this chapter. 
5.1.1 Status Quo of the research problem 
Increasing installations of cyber-physical based systems such as Advanced Metering 
Infrastructures (AMI), bring wide-ranging advantages, but also open doors for cyber-attack 
agents to access end-users’ energy data, understand system weaknesses and the criticality of 
consumer for the system operation. By accessing end-users’ information, data alteration or 
manipulation, intruders can force the system into abnormal states and even cause power 
outages. Because of their harmful and unexpected nature, prevention of cyber-attacks has been 
recognized as a critical issue in the power sector. While there is little disclosed data at present, 
there have been two well documented cases of power-related cyber-attacks which are as 
follows: At the end of 2015, the Ukraine’s power distribution system was exposed to a 
sophisticated cyber-attack [35]. The pre-attack period was started months before the attack-day 
and, hackers observed and determined the intrusion pathways in the power grid [35]. As a result, 
data of key assets was manipulated and almost 225,000 customers experienced a black-out for 
several hours [35]. Cyber-attack incidents on distributed energy resources (DER), as well as 




through a mobile application of  cyber-vulnerability. Hackers gained the control of the vehicle’s 
air-conditioner in approximately 10 seconds and drained its battery during the cyber-incident 
[164]. Unfortunately, there is a limited information on the reconnaissance and sojourn time 
duration of cyber-attacks. As can be noticed from these two cyber incidents reported in [35, 
164], cyber threats have different time scales, unpredictable acts, different reconnaissance and 
waiting (sojourn) times for different technologies and platforms. These complex features 
increase complexities in cyber-attack intrusion modelling for a power system significantly.  
Cyber-intrusion process modelling has received considerable critical attention. In [165], 
a study which was conducted to quantify security failures due to cyber vulnerabilities 
considering conventional computer system layers. It was found that although the security failure 
quantification in the study was well designed, the time scale identification of cyber layer’s 
detection-attack agents present in the study was limited [165]. A recent  study [166], utilized a 
semi-Markov process [167] in a similar way as in [165] to investigate the probability of a 
successful cyber-attack process. The difference between cyber-intrusion methodology applied 
in [166] and the methodology implemented in [165] is that different reconnaissance and waiting 
time scale ranges were created in the former. When the detection-agent time interval was 
modified with different limits, the cyber-attack waiting (sojourn) time in each layer and pre-
attack (reconnaissance) time changed significantly. Thus, changes on calculation of cyber-
attack waiting and pre-attack times has an effect on cyber-attack impact analysis. In addition to 
[165, 166], the same methodology of cyber-intrusion process was used in [168]. Reference 
[168] differs from [166] only in the cyber-attack types and pathways. The studies [166, 168] 
did not take into account the futuristic characteristic of system smart components, smart 




5.2 The Mathematical Framework of Cyber-physical Interactive 
Operations Considering Heat Pump Systems 
5.2.1 State Transition Model for Smart Grid  
As reported by National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource 
(NESCOR) in [169], power systems need a different manner to preserve critical infrastructures 
for present and future developments. Hence, power system studies also require distinctive 
approaches in order to assess futuristic features of smart grid elements. As stated in Figure 5.1, 
 
the study considers three different typical process ways to reach successful cyber intrusion for 



































(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition of Distributed Energy Resources) to show the 
cyber-attack process in a power grid. All three intrusion pathways have equal probabilities to 
compromise a cyber-attack. To demonstrate intrusion path calculations, the final canonical form 












1 − 𝑃1 𝑃1 0 0 0 0
1 − 𝑃2 0 𝑃2 0 0 0
1 − 𝑃3 0 0 𝑃3 0 0
1 − 𝑃4 0 0 0 𝑃4 0
1 − 𝑃5 0 0 0 0 𝑃5







where T (5.2) represents state transition probabilities that [167] demonstrates state transitions 
of semi-Markov model for smart grid, and sub-matrix C refers to transition probabilities 
between the layers. According to these probabilities, there are six distinctive phases P1 –P6 that 
are defined as secure and failed system states respectively. In this cyber-intrusion process, the 
cyber-attack tries to get an advantageous status to pass to the next phase. Thus, P1, P2, P3, P4, 
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(Figure 5.2). The cyber-intrusion process is successful only if the attack reaches absorption state 
P6 of the system. 
5.2.2 Calculation Procedure for Cyber Intrusion Process Times 
5.2.2.1 Definitions and Assumptions for Intrusion Process  
The mission of an attack-agent is to gain a privilege status in a particular period against 
the detection agent. A smart-attack-agent needs to help to the attack-agent for simplifying 
cyber-intrusion preparations in a certain amount of time. In addition, the detection agent must 
spend some time to detect the cyber-intrusion to isolate the attack and limit to successful-attack 
intrusion in each cyber-layer. By means of playing this cyber game in between agents, 
MTTCCyber (Mean Time to Compromise for Cyber-attack) can be computed.  It is defined as a 
statistical time variant that is to obtain the required mean time value to go from the normal 
status to the abnormal status of the system. Moreover, MTTDCyber (Mean Time to Detection for 
Cyber-attack) refers to another statistical time value that is cyber-forensic with physical 
restoration time and this is necessary for the statistical probability evaluation of a successful 
cyber-attack intrusion (PCyber-attack). These two statistical values of threats can vary with attack 






Statistical calculation of PCyber-attack in (5.3) can be utilized in power system reliability and 
resiliency assessments. The investigation aim is to present the smart attack agent role in a 
process of intrusion and to assess the impact on the statistical value of MTTCCyber. Additionally, 




 The investigation considered the mission of a cyber-attack is to force the system to the 
abnormal states. The system has a detection agent in each cyber layer that adversely 
effects the detection of threats and preserves the system at normal conditions.  
 Available detection systems in the cyber-security sector have been designed with 
available cyber-attack data, which are assumed as normal attacks, in a dataset [170]. 
Intelligent attacks or smart-attacks are accepted as unknown and unseen attacks.    
 The investigation assumed component characteristics of a power system would change 
with smart features that would include subordinate smart firewalls and smart detection 
assets. As a result, the investigation includes the detection agents for cyber-attack 
detection. Each cyber layer has a smart detection system and different ability against 
threats in order to minimize their impacts on the system. Thus, the detection time is 
considered in a random manner. 
 The attacker agent needs to spend some time to gain trust of the cyber layer in order to 
get an authorization for passing next stage of smart grid. Additionally, it is assumed that 
the target of the attacker is to cause harm to a smart meter or control panel of HPs for 
energy theft from end users. 
 The intruder is presumed to inject bad data into the system for manipulation of energy 
reading measurements and the detector is supposed to have a capability of anomaly 




5.2.2.2 Calculation of MTTCCyber 
This sub-section aims to introduce statistical calculations of cyber-attack waiting 
(sojourn) times in each cyber layer and total intrusion process time. A fundamental instrument 
is to develop cyber intrusion occurrence and its waiting time in each cyber-physical layer. 
Hence, it is vital to point out the calculation of the required time for each attack phase as well 
as the full attack process. In order to quantify security levels of cyber-physical components on 
the smart grid, the MTTCCyber, refers to requisite time to go from secure to failure status of the 
system that is implemented for power system reliability evaluations. As previously mentioned, 
normal attack 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑛), smart-attack 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑛), and detection agents𝑓(𝑌𝑖) are introduced. 
 
The difference between this chapter approach and previous studies in [165, 166] on 
MTTCCyber calculation is to consider the implementation of a smart-attack agent in each layer. 
Figure 5.3 shows the difference between previous studies approaches on calculation of MTTA 
(Mean time to Attack) [165, 166] and the proposed approach on MTTCCyber in this chapter. As 
𝜏𝑎 ,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥   𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥   𝜏𝑎 ,𝑖  𝜏𝑠,𝑖







Previous version (MTTA) Proposed version (MTTCCyber)
𝜏𝑑
𝑚𝑖𝑛   
 




given in equations (5.5 and 5.6), [𝜏𝑎,𝑖, 𝜏𝑎,𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥] and [𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥] are utilized for lower-upper 
boundary limits of normal attack agent and smart attack agent in each phase respectively. 
This study models attack and defense times while incorporating uniform distributions. 
To begin the calculation process, let 𝑋𝑖𝑛 and  𝑋𝑖𝑠 denote normal attack and smart-attack time 
needed during i-th phase of cyber intrusion for attack and smart-attack agent. Therefore, the 
total attack time equals to normal attack time plus smart-attack time of each phase. In this study, 
corresponding attack intervals are selected in from uniformly distributed random numbers. 
Time range and density functions can be expressed by (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6): 
0 < 𝜏𝑠,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛  < 𝜏𝑎,𝑖   < 𝜏𝑠,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  <  𝜏𝑎,𝑖






, 𝜏𝑎,𝑖    < 𝑋𝑖











𝑚𝑖𝑛   < 𝑋𝑖




As described in (5.5) and (5.6), [𝜏𝑎,𝑖, 𝜏𝑎,𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥] and [𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥] are utilized for lower-upper 
boundary limits of 𝑋𝑖𝑛 and 𝑋𝑖𝑠 in each phase respectively. 
Whereas 𝑋𝑖𝑛 and  𝑋𝑖𝑠 refer to the total operations of attack times, 𝑌𝑖 refers to the detection 
time of the cyber intrusion during i-th phase for detection agent. To select appropriate time 
intervals for 𝑌𝑖, uniform distribution function is applied in the present study. The 𝑌𝑖 detection 
time interval is chosen as [𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜏𝑎,𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥] for each cyber layer. In each phase of the system, relation 
on determination of successful attack intrusion and detection probability are presented by: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 < [𝑋𝑖
𝑛+𝑋𝑖
𝑠]) + 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 > [𝑋𝑖
𝑛+𝑋𝑖




As stated in (5.7), the probability of successful detection, where 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 < [𝑋𝑖𝑛 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠]), is 
computed by using conditional probability theorem as: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 < [𝑋𝑖
𝑛+𝑋𝑖




𝑠] = 𝜏) 𝑓[𝑋𝑖
𝑛+𝑋𝑖




















































While the probability of successful detection at each phase of the system is as in (5.8), waiting 
(sojourn) time 𝑊𝑖 at each phase of the system is referred to 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑌𝑖, [𝑋𝑖𝑛 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠]}. By the 
help of [165], waiting time (𝑊𝑖) at each phase is calculated for the transient state. 
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The MTTCCyber is calculated according to the procedure obtained by[165, 171]. It is as follows: 






where Ni is expected statistical number of times in i transient state phase that the system reaches 
failure state finally. It is considered as in [171] and  is written (5.11): 
𝑁𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖∑𝑁𝑗𝑇𝑗𝑖
𝑗
   (5.11) 
where qi denotes the probability of the process starts from state i. It is assumed that the initial 
status is the secure state. 
As explained previously, calculation process of MTTCCyber needs to be carefully 
examined due to disparities (time intervals, severity of layers etc.) between each cyber/system 
layer characteristics. Taking into consideration these disparities, security of each cyber layer 
could be quantified more accurately with this process. It is assumed that each layer behaves 
differently against cyber intrusion during the process due to future characteristics of smart grids. 
Each layer could have a different impact on statistical calculations of MTTCCyber. For this 
reason, calculation process of cyber intrusion probability (PCyber-attack) is carefully examined 
with effect of MTTDCyber.  
As far as MTTCCyber is concerned, MTTDCyber plays an essential role when evaluating 
PCyber-attack as well as cyber-physical system reliability. It is important to highlight that the 
system will remain in the failure status for a certain amount of time until the detection agent 
catches the attacker. In this study, detection time denotes detection time plus recovery time of 
the system. Therefore, it is necessary that detection time (MTTDCyber) identification for PCyber-
attack calculations is essential. This unique value could change according to attack type, 
frequency, strength and severity of layers etc. As previous studies stated [166, 168, 172], there 
is no available real data for detection time. These studies [166, 168, 172] utilize a constant 




reason, this mean detection time needs to be determined according to statistical analysis of 
detection agent’s capabilities. Within this target, this study has tried to understand fundamental 
behaviour of detection processes and underlying distribution of detection time. There is a large 
volume of published studies describing the role of intrusion detection related to computer 
science. Mainly, intrusion detection studies are classified into two types: misuse and anomaly 
detection[173, 174]. As the aim of the attacker is energy theft from consumers with false data 
injection, the study only considered as anomaly detection of the detection time. In the anomaly-
based detection mechanism, the intruder can only be detected if it acts in a different way 
compared to legitimate behaviour of the system. Thus far, several studies have indicated that 
intrusion detection process could obey heavy-tail distribution characteristics [175-177]. Heavy-
tail distributions are probability density functions that their tails are not limited exponentially. 
The results show that detection time follows heavy-tail distribution nature, especially in [176]. 
Sampling path of a heavy-tailed featured system declines slowly, and its efficacy falls over 
time. Therefore, heavy tail distributions have been utilized for sampling of many extreme event 
such as floods, tsunamis etc.  Because cyber-attacks are considered  as rare and extreme events 
and they are less extreme over time due to not being anymore as unseen threats [176, 178], 
marginal distribution of intrusion detection times may follow heavy tail pattern. On the other 
hand, some previous studies confirmed the effectiveness of Gaussian distribution on intrusion 
detection process [179, 180]. As in [179], system error is assumed to follow normal distribution. 
Reference [180] has confirmed that manipulated data may pursue Gaussian distribution if 
adversary has information on detection technique. As a result of many variables and 
uncertainties in relation of adversary and detection, statistical value of MTTDCyber is considered 




pool that has a specific range and distribution technique. MTTDCyber is carefully chosen from 
following pool with pre-defined distribution:  
4ℎ = 𝛼1 ≤ 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 ≤ 𝛼2 = 1000ℎ 
(5.12) 






𝛼1and 𝛼2  are considered as lower and upper boundaries of detection time, respectively. For 
this study, heavy tail (General Pareto, Stable, Pareto distributions) and Gaussian distributions 
are utilized for selection of MTTDCyber in each case. One might disagree with upper boundary 
limit of MTTDCyber due to inexperience of power sector on cyber-intrusions, but restoration of 
the system could take more than a month [163]. Having discussed how to calculate MTTCCyber 
and MTTDCyber, the following section of this chapter addresses component-based reliability 
model for heating system. 
5.2.3 Component-based Reliability Modelling for Heating System  
Heat pumps are becoming a fundamental property of a smart grid and low carbon 
transitions. As a result of an increase in the installment rate of heat pump and its deployment 
projection in power grids [181], effect of heat pumps on power system reliability needs to be 
addressed carefully. The study utilizes a common implementation model of heating system in 
a power grid to compute composite system availability with piecewise element consideration 
[182]. By doing so, Markov transition models are developed for the heating system and heating 
system model is divided into three subsections as in Figure 5.4. It consists of control panel 




series system respectively. This system is modelled with 8-state Markov transition matrix (M8) 
if there is a successful cyber-intrusion.   
M4= [
−𝜆𝐻 − 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 𝜆𝐻 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0
𝜇𝐻 −𝜇𝐻 − 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟
𝜇𝑆 0 −𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟 − 𝜆𝐻 𝜆𝐻














−𝜆𝐶−𝜆𝐻−𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 𝜆𝐶 𝜆𝐻 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 0 0 0
𝜇𝐶 −𝜇𝐶−𝜆𝐻−𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 0 𝜆𝐻 0 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0
𝜇𝐻 0 −𝜆𝐶−𝜇𝐻−𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 𝜆𝐶 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 0
𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 0 −𝜆𝐶−𝜆𝐻−𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 𝜆𝐻 𝜆𝐶 0
0 𝜇𝐻 𝜇𝐶 0 −𝜇𝐶−𝜇𝐻−𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 0 0 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟
0 0 𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟 𝜇𝐻 0 −𝜇𝐻−𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟−𝜆𝐶 0 𝜆𝐶
0 𝜇𝑆 0 𝜇𝐶 0 0 −𝜇𝐶−𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟−𝜆𝐻 𝜆𝐻












Whether there is a cyber-intrusion, the availability calculation considers a 4-state Markov 
model (M4) that involves sub-section 2 and 3. The sub-section 1 of heating system is considered 
as a control panel that has a capability of two-way communication and stores consumer reading 
data. Its statistical values of failure-recovery against cyber-intrusion plays a key role for 

























By means of PCyber-attack, the study estimates 𝜆𝐶 , 𝜇𝐶 composite availability analysis of 
cyber-physical system. Following that, the sub-section 2 is composed of a heat pump 
(𝜆𝐻𝑃, 𝜇𝐻𝑃), a switch ( 𝜆𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ, 𝜇𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ) and an auxiliary heater (𝜆𝐴𝐻, 𝜇𝐴𝐻). In addition, the 
estimated availability of a heat pump is determined with its internal elements that includes an 
evaporator ( 𝜆𝐸𝑣𝑎, 𝜇𝐸𝑣𝑎), a compressor ( 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝, 𝜇𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝), a condenser ( 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝜇𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑), and an 
expansion valve ( 𝜆𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 , 𝜇𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒) as a series internal system. One of the generic heat pump 
models [182] is demonstrated in Figure 5.5. 
Defining series or parallel arrangement of any system has a significant importance on reliability 
calculations [3]. Thus, formulas (5.15)-(5.18) are adapted as a fundamental part of the reliability 





















⟹ 𝑃𝑓𝐻𝑃 = 1 − 𝑃𝑟𝐻𝑃  
(5.16) 
𝜆𝐻𝑃 = 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝜆𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 + 𝜆𝐸𝑣𝑎 (5.17) 
 






 𝜆𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 ., 𝜇𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒   
 
 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑  , 𝜇𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑  
 
 𝜆𝐸𝑣𝑎 ,𝜇𝐸𝑣𝑎   
 




𝜇𝐻𝑃 = 𝜆𝐻𝑃 × 𝑃𝑟𝐻𝑃 × 𝑃𝑓𝐻𝑃
−1 (5.18) 
Once the reliability of internal components of a heat pump is computed, a series arranged 







) ⟹ 𝑃𝑓𝐴𝐻 = 1 − 𝑃𝑟𝐴𝐻 (5.19) 
𝜆𝐴𝐻𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝜆𝐴𝐻 + 𝜆𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ (5.20) 
𝜇𝐴𝐻𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝜆𝐴𝐻𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 × 𝑃𝑟𝐴𝐻 × 𝑃𝑓𝐴𝐻
−1 (5.21) 
After completion of reliability calculations for series arranged components (𝜆𝐻𝑃, 𝜇𝐻𝑃-
𝜆𝐴𝐻𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 , 𝜇𝐴𝐻𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙), a parallel arrangement of estimated failure-repair rates is used to reach the 







) ⟹ 𝑃𝑟𝐻 = 1 − 𝑃𝑓𝐻 (5.22) 
𝜇𝐻 = 𝜇𝐴𝐻𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝜇𝐻𝑃 (5.23) 
𝜆𝐻 = 𝜇𝐻 × 𝑃𝑓𝐻 × 𝑃𝑟𝐻
−1 (5.24) 
The final sub-section is assumed as heat storage of which the, failure and repair rate are denoted 
by 𝜆𝑆𝑡𝑟 , 𝜇𝑆𝑡𝑟.Taken together all, piecewise reliability calculation will incorporate the Markov 
model of heating system to compute the system availability at a top down level. 
5.2.4 Availability Analysis for Heating System with Cyber-physical Component 
In this study, a framework is presented to calculate overall system availability, and it is 
an indicator of system reliability. 4-state(𝑀4) and 8-state (𝑀8) stochastic transition matrices 




vectors, Markov transition matrixes are implemented into the following equation (5.25) by 






where 𝑣 represents the eigenvalues of a transpose matrix 𝑀, 𝑣  is the eigenvectors of transpose 
matrix 𝑀 and 𝑆 denotes a constant that is calculated according to the initial system state. 
Afterwards, the general problem solution is the assayed for 4-state and 8-state transitions as 










In general, the system availability is evaluated as a one of the factors for reliability analysis. 
Availability and unavailability of the system can be represented by operational and non-
operational system state probabilities respectively. It is written as in (5.27): 
𝑃(𝑡) = 𝑃1(𝑡) + ⋯+ 𝑃𝑛(𝑡) = 𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑈(𝑡) (5.27) 
To calculate 𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛 constant values for the availability, considering the system at t=0 is in 
fully-operational state(𝑃1|𝑡=0 = 1; 𝑃2|𝑡=0 = 0;… ; 𝑃𝑛|𝑡=0 = 0), (5.28) is expressed as: 






















𝑣2𝜏 + ⋯ + 𝑆𝑛𝑣2𝑛𝑒
𝑣𝑛𝜏
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
𝑃𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑆1𝑣𝑛1𝑒
𝑣1𝜏 + 𝑆2𝑣𝑛2𝑒
𝑣2𝜏 + ⋯ + 𝑆𝑛𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑒
𝑣𝑛𝜏
    (5.29) 
5.2.5 Power System Reliability Assessment in a Smart Grid 
This study has considered composite-system availability as a factor of power system 
reliability analysis with cyber-intrusion effects. If there are external effects on a power system 
from the latest system drivers which could be a control panel of heating system, then traditional 
power system reliability analysis should evolve to assess the impact of these cyber-physical 
components of control panel. It is assumed that the control panel of heating system is linked to 
smart meter. System designers and decision makers of power grids should examine the 
operational reliability even if there is not a cyber-intrusion through a heating system. Regular 
assessment can help to avoiding system loses and blackouts [184]. Composite system 
availability analysis and its reliability calculation procedure are described in the Figure 5.6 with 
following steps: 
i. Select the relevant reliability data for each component of a heating system, generators, 
transformers, lines and buses; determine heat pump profile pool and time intervals for 
each cyber-layer transitions. 
ii. Randomly select a day and a heat pump user for HP load profile. 
iii. Extract HP load for time t from selected profile. Initialize number of intrusion attempts 
iv. Model MTTCCyber and MTTDCyber according to sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 with given 




v. Check the number of successful cyber-intrusions within the assumed 100 attempts in 
time t. This process is depicted as in (5.30): 
𝐹𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 = {
0, 𝑟 ≤ 𝑃𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟−𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
1, 𝑟 > 𝑃𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟−𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
 (5.30) 
Where 𝐹𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 denotes number of successful cyber-intrusion attempts within 100 
attempts and 𝑟 is a random number. 𝐹𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 is a function that helps to estimate failures 
of cyber-physical system. Initial condition of successful cyber-intrusion attempt 
𝐴𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 is zero. If the attempt success to be higher than 𝑟, 𝐴𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 is increased. 
Estimated failure rate of control panel is expressed as 𝜆1 = 1/𝐴𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙  for time t. 
vi. By means of 𝑟 ≤ 𝑃𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟−𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘, relevant stochastic transition matrix can be chosen.   
vii. According to a relevant transition matrix system, calculate updated failure-repair rates 
of heating sub-systems as in section 5.2.3. 
viii. Afterwards, compute the eigenvectors and the eigenvalues of the system as in section 
5.2.4 and build relevant composite system availability function for at time t. 
ix. Quantify availability function according the system state. The study assumes that the 
target of the attacker is to manipulate data on control panel readings. If the attacker has 
successfully intruded into the control panel, the attacker transforms the original load 
data of HP and increases meter reading in the unavailability level (%) of system at time 
t. 
x. Re-generate HP load value and re-produce it for time t. Afterwards, Extract re-





xi. Select physical system state randomly. 
Data input: (reliability data of each 
component for heating system and 
hourly heat pump load profiles 
Start
Data input: (time 
intervals for each cyber-
layer transition) 
Read heat pump load for time t=0 
Calculate failure & repair 
rates of heating sub-systems 
Conduct heating sub-system 
probability to into the 8-state 
Markov Chains  
Calculate eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors for time t 
Perform availability function 
for heating system time t 
Re-generate heat pump load 
for time t
t=144?
















Compute Mean Time To Compromise (MTTCCyber) 
Model Randomly Mean Time To Detection (MTTDCyber) 
(According to relevant distribution) 
Select randomly a day and a consumer
Initialize number of intrusion attempts n=0 
𝑭𝑪𝒚𝒃𝒆𝒓 = {
𝟎, 𝒓 ≤ 𝑷𝑪𝒚𝒃𝒆𝒓−𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌
𝟏, 𝒓 > 𝑷𝑪𝒚𝒃𝒆𝒓−𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌
 










𝑨𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒔𝒇𝒖𝒍 = 𝑨𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒔𝒇𝒖𝒍 + 𝟏 
FCyber=0?
Neglect control panel
Conduct heating sub-system 
probability to into the 4-state 








xii. Perform power flow considering power balance with global voltage limits.  
xiii. If the computation is not converged, go to xi. 
xiv. Compute load curtailment of the whole system. 
xv. Estimate the EENS. 
5.3 Case Studies and Analysis 
In this section, the case studies are performed with the Roy Bilinton Test System (RBTS) 
[185]. The RBTS consists of six buses with 11 generators and 9 power transmission lines. The 
total installed generation capacity and peak load is 240 MW and 185 MW respectively. The 
RBTS topology is modified with 100 heat pump users’ integrated on Bus 2 and Bus 3. 
5.3.1 Input Data for Cyber-Intrusion Process in Smart Grid 
This part explains the data utilized for reliability analysis of case studies. The reliability 
analysis of heating systems utilizes the data is shown in Table 5.1. This data is gathered from 
[186]. 
Table 5.1 Reliability Data for Heat Pump System [186] 
Components λ (Failure rate/y) µ (Repair rate/y) 
Compressor 0.01354 0.1153 
Condenser 0.0268 0.1394 
Evaporator 0.00404 0.068 
Expansion valve 0.00027 0.3333 
Storage 0.00404 0.0551 
Switch 0.00628 0.2381 





Table 5.2 Utilized Time Intervals for a Smart Distribution Systems 
Cyber-layer 
Transitions 𝜏𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛(h) 𝜏𝑎 (h) 𝜏𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑥(h) 𝜏𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥(h) 
Secure to L1 [1-4] ---- ---- [50-60] 
L1 to L2 [1-4] [14-18] [35-45] [50-60] 
L2 to L3 [1-4] [14-18] [50-60] [60-70] 
L3 to L4 [1-4] [14-18] [50-60] [60-70] 
L4 to F [1-4] [14-18] [50-60] [60-70] 
F to S [1-4] ---- ---- [50-60] 
On the other hand, time intervals for calculation of MTTCCyber are randomly selected 
from Table 5.2 for each phase. The study assumes that each cyber layer has its own time 
characteristic and the capability of the attacker will have a different approach on waiting 
(sojourn) time. As a result of this, time intervals of sojourn time should be carefully chosen 
according to the capability of each cyber-layer. These values are assumed as in Table 5.2 
because of the data availability on sojourn time. Heat pump load profile data is allocated from 
open source [187]. This data consists of heat pump load profiles of 19 customer over a month 
during the heating season [187]. Since data accuracy and cleansing, the study only uses HP load 
data of 10 customers for re-generating HP load profiles. Utilized HP data has been randomly 
chosen from 350 HP load profile samples of data pool [187]. 
5.3.2 Scenario 1: Cyber-attack on HP during Peak Times  
The aim of the attacker is to malfunction the heat pump user site and manipulate 
electricity usage of each HP user. It is assumed that the attacked HP site includes 100 end-users 
in total. Due to not being caught by a system operator, the hacker affects the operation of the 
HP during peak times with 20-minute ranges. It is selected because of the assumption of the 




reliability if a cyber-attack can intrude the heating system in a small discrete time range during 
peak hours. According to original HP load profiles, the peak hours are divided into two parts: 
morning (03:00-09:00) and night times (18:00-22:30). The detection-recovery time 
(MTTDCyber) calculations are developed with four different distribution techniques for this 
study. The availability calculation of heating system relies on random number generation of 
detection time (MTTDCyber) by means of following distributions. These are: 
 
Pareto, General Pareto, Gaussian and Stable distributions. Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 
describe comparison of aggregated original HP load profile and HP load profile with cyber-
intrusion in consideration of different distributions of MTTDCyber. As can be seen from Figure 
5.7 and Figure 5.8, the main character of the threat’s impact is to increase load demand of HP 
during morning and night peak times. The increment on utilized electricity in each aggregated 
 
Figure 5.7 Comparison of raw aggregated HP load profile and HP load profile with cyber-
intrusion (cyber-intrusion only during the peak times) - a) MTTDCyber is considered as a 







profile follows a slight change. There is a clear discrete upward trend of electricity utilization 
roughly 0.1-0.3 kW during peak hours. This is because of the unavailability ratio of the heating 
system that is the result of attacks. Figure 5.7 follows a similar pathway and the peak load 
demand reaches around 2.5 kW. On the other hand, aggregated HP load profiles with Gaussian 
(Figure 5.8) and Stable (Figure 5.8) distribution random numbers have higher peak (2.9 kW) 
than Pareto distributions related HP load profiles. Surprisingly, it seems that the impact of 
intrusion on electricity consumption remains in a low-level increase in all cases. Figure 5.7 and 




Figure 5.8 Comparison of raw aggregated HP load profile and HP load profile with cyber-
intrusion (cyber-intrusion only during the peak times) - a) MTTDCyber is considered as a 






What stands out in the Table 5.3 is that the increment on Expected Energy Not Supplied 
(EENS) changes slightly for all cases. In all cases, disparity range of EENS between affected 
and original HP load profiles changes between 6.459 MWh/year and 35.407 MWh/year. By 
analysing Table 5.3 closely, the operational reliability diminishes range between 0.06 % and 
0.4 % with 100 end-users. In the purview of operating status of the power systems, the 
implementation of Scenario 1  into large power demand sites with thousands end-users, the 
impact of the intrusions may trigger to potential frequency instability as well as leading to 
cascading failures. In addition, this change on EENS can boost operating costs for the system 
operator and increase financial losses for end-users. 
Table 5.3 EENS Changes for Scenario 1 








Distribution Stable Distribution 
Original HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9500.447 9495.933 9594.718 9828.953 
Affected HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9526.679 9504.201 9622.154 9835.412 
EENS Disparity 
(MWh/year) 26.232 8.268 27.436 6.459 
RBTS Bus 3 
Original HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9050.037 9174.407 9165.045 9333.123 
Affected HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9078.541 9198.608 9200.452 9349.729 
EENS Disparity 
(MWh/year) 28.504 24.201 35.407 16.606 
For this scenario, Bus 3 is has greater impact than Bus 2 in the context of a reliability 
performance. The affected load profiles of General Pareto and Pareto distributions follow very 
similar pathways. However, the unavailability rate of the heating system with these 
distributions is higher than Stable and Gaussian methods in both buses. It is apparent from 




technique is less than other techniques in both buses. It means the performance adaptation of 
stable detection time (MTTDCyber) on this cyber intrusion process is slightly better than Gaussian 
detection-time (MTTDCyber) method and others.  
As previously mentioned in this chapter, several studies have indicated that intrusion 
detection process could obey heavy-tail distribution characteristics [175-177]. Detection time 
follows heavy-tail distribution nature, especially in [176] because of attack-detection process is 
accepted as extreme event process. Selection of these distribution functions depends on data 
rate of queuing system of sensors [176].  For instance, heavy tail distributions have been used 
understanding behaviour of unique electricity price spikes and their extreme volatility 
characteristics [189]. Optimal selection of heavy-tail distributions for attack-detection process 
can dependent upon experiences of data sensors of power system if the attack is previously 
foreseen. Thus, data experience of ICT sensors is going to play a key role in attack-detection 
time process.       
5.3.3 Scenario 2: Cyber-attack on Heat Pump through All Day  
Similarly, the target of the intruder is to disturb continuously HP consumers and re-
shape the data with the unavailability of the HP system for this scenario. The number of HP 
users and detection-recovery time methods are same as the Scenario 1. Both Figure 5.9 and 
Figure 5.10 present an overview of an aggregated original HP load profile and HP load profile 
with continual effect of cyber-intrusion. Compared to Scenario 1, it can be clearly seen in Figure 
5.9 and Figure 5.10  that there is certain amount of electricity rise on HP load demand with each 
detection time technique. This increase varies between 0.15 kW and 0.4 kW for each aggregated 




kW in all cases, except in the Gaussian detection-time method. As shown in Figure 5.10, the 
peak load peaks at 3.1 kW in the afternoon. 
 
The most striking result to emerge from figures (Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9 and 
Figure 5.10) is that there is another peak time for this HP site, which is around 13:00-14:00. It 
is because of the small data pool. This increment can be decreased with a high number of end-
users who uses HP technology. Table 5.4 provides EENS changes in between aggregated 
original HP load profile and HP load profile with cyber-intrusion. Table 5.4 also compares 
different detection-time distribution effect on the system reliability. EENS disparity ranges 
between 76.366 MWh/year and 161.703 MWh/year. The operational reliability decreases range 
between 0.8 % and 1.8 % with 100 end-users. The EENS disparity range is much higher than 
scenario 1 for both of buses. Nevertheless, Bus 2 is affected more than Bus 3 in regard to the 
 
Figure 5.9 Comparison of raw aggregated HP load profile and HP load profile with cyber-
intrusion (all day along) - a) MTTDCyber is considered as a General Pareto random number, 






system reliability. The reaction of both the general Pareto and Pareto distribution related 
detection time method on EENS changes is similar as in Scenario 1. 
 
However, General Pareto and Pareto distributions have a better EENS performance on 
detection time compared to others. It shows that unavailability of the heating system with Pareto 
distribution is less than other methods. These results suggest that General Pareto detection time 
technique on cyber intrusion process has a better performance on reliability calculations. These 
scenarios are quite revealing in some ways. First, performance efficacy of detection time 
techniques can rely on discrete or continuous impact of cyber-intrusions due to the number of 
data points of detection time analysis. 
 
Figure 5.10 Comparison of raw aggregated HP load profile and HP load profile with 
cyber-intrusion (all day along) - a)MTTDCyber is considered as a Gaussian random 







Table 5.4 EENS Changes for Scenario 2 








Distribution Stable Distribution 
Original HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9610.035 9344.22 9246.872 9267.607 
Affected HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9706.609 9489.473 9349.74 9429.31 
EENS Disparity 
(MWh/year) 96.574 145.253 102.868 161.703 
RBTS Bus 3 
Original HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9155.525 9094.714 9109.013 9047.479 
Affected HP Profiles 
(MWh/year) 9231.891 9194.847 9186.262 9178.57 
EENS Disparity 
(MWh/year) 76.366 100.133 77.249 131.091 
A high number of data points increases the performance of the Pareto distribution 
technique on the reliability assessment framework and brings less impact on EENS. Secondly, 
different HP site connections might have a different impact on cyber-intrusion into system 
power reliability. It is apparent from both scenarios that the impact of cyber-intrusion can be 
escalated with detection-time durations on the system unavailability. However, the performance 
of detection time distributions can differ according to data pool size and affected site location 
characteristics. These factors can be limitations of this study. The most obvious finding to 
emerge from this study is that the variable MTTDCyber is well-suited into the estimation of attack 
probability for the realistic availability assessment of control panel compared to the constant 
MTTDCyber due to the stochastic characteristics of the cyber-threats. The attack process with the 
constant MTTDCyber in any power system reliability analysis can be limited and bring short-
coming for robust assessments.  
It is widely acknowledged in power systems that the sudden changes on load demand 




serious consequences with high economic loss. Nevertheless, data manipulation intrusions with 
load-altering on HPs has remained a challenge until this chapter. Therefore, one of the most 
essential contributions of this chapter is to reveal such cyber-intrusions’ impact with HPs on 
power system reliability and power system operating perspective.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter proposes a composite availability analysis framework for cyber-physical 
interactive operation with heat pump systems. It is capable of analysing the cyber-intrusion 
impacts on power system reliability. To evaluate the system reliability, an innovative 
mathematical framework of the cyber-intrusion process in a smart grid environment for power 
system applications is presented. Having smart characteristics in a cyber-intrusion process is 
aimed to illustrate how futuristic characteristics can change calculation of attack-time duration. 
In addition, a sensitivity analysis of cyber-intrusion detection-time distributions on cyber-
physical interactive power system reliability is proposed in order to disclose their compatibility 
on Mean Time to Detection for Cyber-attack (MTTDCyber). The case study is carried out on the 
RBTS (Roy Bilinton Test System) for simulating cyber malfunctioning on the control panel of 
heat pumps (HPs). Scenario 1 evaluates the impact of cyber-intrusions on heating system with 
discrete time durations within peak times of the day. Scenario 2 analyses the impact of cyber-
intrusion on heating system throughout the day (continuous time). According to EENS results, 
applied heavy tail distributions on detection-time calculations reveal their necessity and 
adaptability levels on cyber-physical interactive operations of power systems. Not to mention, 
cyber-intrusion effects on heating system brings noteworthy vulnerability on operational 




Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 General Overview 
Power systems are usually susceptible to operational malfunctions and faults. These 
faults are expected to be increased by high-level penetrations of low carbon technologies with 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). It is mainly because of unpredictable 
behaviours and features of these innovative technologies, escalating the complexity of power 
grid, its ageing power infrastructure, and accelerating the power system transformation towards 
smarter concepts.  
Power system reliability has been studied by many researchers using different 
techniques. Reliability assessment techniques are based on the proposed objectives by 
assessors. Hence, power system reliability assessment methods can change objective by 
objective. There is no multi-purpose technique in order to solve all power system reliability 
issues. In general, power system reliability assessment methods can be classified into analytical 
and Monte Carlo simulation based methods. Also, there are a considerable amount of hybrid 
reliability study in power systems. This thesis focused on hybrid methodologies to evaluate 
power system reliability considering Photovoltaic (PV) and Heat Pump (HP) systems with 
Cyber-physical System (CPS) operation. 
As well as the reliability of power systems is already one of the concerns of power 
system operation, so far, its related evaluation studies consider power systems mostly as a 
physical property. Nevertheless, by the increasing portion of communication infrastructure 




vulnerability of power systems has changed, and brought new additional internal and external 
concepts such as cyber-vulnerabilities and cyber-malfunctions. This transformation could 
increase challenges, uncertainties, and affect more reliable operating conditions of power 
systems. Thus, power system reliability assessment studies without CPS operation and the 
effects of cyber threats are deficit analysis, and even they are wide of the target of efficient 
evaluations. 
There are several difficulties on the power system reliability assessment with CPS 
operation. These are mainly: 1) the unpredictability of cyber threats, 2) the severity or intensity 
of cyber-event, 3) time duration of the cyber event, 4) the damage level of the event, 5) the 
uncertainty on failure rate and repair times, and 6) the lack of data availability on cyber-threats, 
their impact and consequences. In general, these difficulties could associate with the 
inexperience of power sector on cyber-intrusion effects and limitations on the data-sharing of 
experienced cyber-breaching events due to they are seen as national security issue. As a result, 
these external factors also increase reliability analysis challenges and complexity on the 
simulations of CPS availability estimations. 
This thesis provided research frameworks associate with the reliability concept of power 
systems with CPS operation by availability models of PV and HP systems in terms of simplicity 





6.2.1 Power System Reliability Assessment without CPS Interactive Operation 
An analysis framework is proposed for the power system reliability assessment without 
taking into account CPS components in Chapter 3. The procedural steps of traditional power 
system reliability analysis is presented in order to examine general effects of PV power 
generation and load demand. Furthermore, it considers that an increasing amount of centralised 
& decentralised renewable generation is penetrated into the IEEE RTS79 with different case 
studies. 
Increasing load demand leads to decrease in the system reliability in both original and 
linerarised load demand scenarios. Linearised load demand has slightly associated with greater 
EENS values compared to original load demand profiles due to design disparity of load profiles. 
It can be interpreted that intermittency on load demand can diminish the system reliability up 
to 1.33%. Results also show that the installation capacity of PV system in the power grid varies 
with available load capacity. The integration limits of PV generation in the power grid were 
around 14.75 % and 13.15 % of the base case for linearised and original PV generation profiles 
when implementing maximum load scale. In addition, PV system installed capacity limits 
escalated 19.75 % and 17.5 % of base case load capacity with minimum load scale. As a 
consequence, minimum load scaling factor is more favourable for implementing PV generators 
compared to maximum load scaling factor, and the location of load in the test system could be 
another influencing factor for the occurrence of higher penetration of PV generation with 




Not only the intermittent characteristics, but also the location of PV systems have an 
essential effect on their installed generation capacity in power grid. The results suggest that it 
does not necessarily mean maximum load capacity can lead to higher penetration levels of PV 
systems in power grids. Thus, the research emphasises the importance of demand and 
generation curve selections for power system reliability assessments that can affect the accuracy 
and robustness of results, accordingly. 
6.2.2 Availability model for PV systems with CPS operation in Power System 
Reliability 
A novel stochastic reliability assessment framework is proposed for PV powered 
systems with cyber-physical interactive operations in order to quantify the degree of risk caused 
by randomly generated cyber-threats in chapter 4. In addition, the sensitivity of CPS’s repair 
time strategy is presented. Case studies showed that the impact of cyber-threats were variable 
and unstable against different PV generation levels. Even though the integration of distributed 
PV generation systems is more beneficial than centralised PV generation systems, the 
propagation of cyber-intrusions can be constrained by centralised PV connection nodes with 
substation protection elements. Adding protection elements into substations can improve the 
system reliability by up to 1.4% for IEEE RTS79. On the other hand, ICT protection scheme 
with RBTS decreases EENS between 13% and 25% level compared to conventional RBTS. 
Also, the deployment of large-scale centralised PV generation systems can be restricted, if 
traditional power system operation practices contain a cyber-physical network. Proposed 
approach mitigates the complexity of the assessment process. Proposed hybrid framework can 





6.2.3 Availability model for HP systems with CPS operation in Power System 
Reliability  
  A novel availability-reliability analysis framework is proposed for cyber-physical 
interactive operation with HPs. This model presents an all-encompassing cyber-intrusion 
process for data manipulation of the electricity demand of end-users, via various Markov-chain 
transition models. The major cyber-attack pathways and fundamental intrusion phases are also 
presented for smart power networks. The proposed cyber-intrusion process is developed with 
random selection of attack and detection time. By means of this model, the failure rate of the 
cyber-physical component is estimated in each random intrusion attempt in order to conduct a 
comprehensive availability analysis of heat pump systems as part of a power system reliability 
assessment. In addition, a sensitivity analysis of detection-time (MTTDCyber) distributions on 
the calculation of cyber-attack probability (PCyber-attack) is proposed in order to evaluate the 
availability of cyber-physical component of HPs. EENS results show that the implemented 
detection-time distributions have considerable effects on the cyber-attack probability (PCyber-
attack) as well as on the system availability. Because of the calculation of PCyber-attack, the 
operational reliability is unstable. The selection of randomized detection time has significant 
effects on the statistical calculation of the probability of cyber-intrusions, as well as on power 
system reliability. Randomised detection time leads to a decrease in operational reliability by 
up to 1.8%, when only considering 100-heat pump users site. In order to carry out an authentic 
availability analysis of the CPS component, especially randomized detection time (MTTDCyber) 
takes an essential role due to cyber-threats’ unpredictable features. The most obvious finding 
to emerge from this research is that the variable MTTDCyber is well-suited into the estimation of 




constant MTTDCyber due to the stochastic characteristics of the cyber-threats. The attack process 
with the constant MTTDCyber in any power system reliability analysis can be limited and bring 
short-coming for robust assessments. The insights gained from this study can be of assistance 
in many avenues including vulnerability analysis for extreme events, and the proposed 
availability-reliability framework can be useful in the feasibility studies of CPS component 
integration for power system planning and operation. 
Overall, this thesis presents the pathways of the availability calculation of CPS components 
and essentiality of cyber-intrusion process on complete power system reliability assessments.   
Applied techniques also reveal necessities and adaptability levels of detection-time 
approximations in order to calculate cyber-intrusion probability when estimating operational 
reliability of power systems. Multi-pronged analysis of MTTDCyber is continuously needed for 
power system reliability due to random cyber-attack characteristics. 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
The possible future work is presented as follows: 
 A reliability model with all the cyber-physical components of smart grids in a cyber-
physical test bed: This thesis has proposed the availability modelling for cyber-physical 
systems and reliability assessment frameworks considering distributed energy resource 
technologies with their cyber-physical operations. Nevertheless, a complete reliability 
evaluation needs to consider all cyber, physical and cyber-physical elements with their 




with cyber-physically operated test bed. Proposed reliability models in this thesis could 
be utilized as a baseline for the generalized cyber-physical reliability framework.  
 A value analysis framework for cyber-physical interactive operation of low-carbon 
technologies: Power system adequacy analysis plays a key role in a comprehensive power 
system reliability assessment, and the adequacy analysis with availability frameworks are 
presented to be utilized in decision-making process. In addition, a value analysis of power 
systems is another part of the decision making process that alternatively assess power 
system reliability with economic terms for system operators and planners. In the context 
of minimum investment maximum profit for energy companies, the value analysis 
framework including cyber-physical system operations could be beneficial to evaluate the 
future investment cost of power and communication infrastructure before any decision-
making process.       
 A cyber-insurance framework in the context of power system risk assessment: The 
reliability-risk studies of power systems mainly remain limited in perspective of cyber-
physical system interactions within related studies, and most of them are hardly 
associated with economy indicators of power systems. As previously mentioned, power 
systems with cyber-physical components are more vulnerable to cyber-malfunctions and 
cyber-intrusions. These failures and interruptions can cause high level economic loses 
during the system operations. The effects of cyber-threats can be minimized but cannot 
be avoided. Cyber-insurance framework can be referred to as cyber-risk assessment 
framework and can also be a form of cover to preserve power system utilities from threats, 
such as data breaches or malicious cyber hacks on work computer systems. As a result, a 
cyber-insurance framework for utility companies could help to get financial 




be cost-effective and it can positively affect the power system operations. Proposed 
availability-reliability models in this thesis can also be used as a base for a cyber-




Chapter 7: Appendix 
7.1 The IEEE Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS)  
In this section, the information of the IEEE Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS) which was 
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Table 7.3 Branch Data for the IEEE-RTS 


















1  1  2  0.003  0.14  0.461  175  193  200  0  
2  1  3  0.055  0.211  0.057  175  208  220  0  
3  1  5  0.022  0.085  0.023  175  208  220  0  
4  2  4  0.033  0.127  0.034  175  208  220  0  
5  2  6  0.05  0.192  0.052  175  208  220  0  
6  3  9  0.031  0.119  0.032  175  208  220  0  
7  3  24  0.002  0.084  0  400  510  600  1.015  
8  4  9  0.027  0.104  0.028  175  208  220  0  
9  5  10  0.023  0.088  0.024  175  208  220  0  
10  6  10  0.014  0.061  2.459  175  193  200  0  
11  7  8  0.016  0.061  0.017  175  208  220  0  
12  8  9  0.043  0.165  0.045  175  208  220  0  
13  8  10  0.043  0.165  0.045  175  208  220  0  
14  9  11  0.0002  0.084  0  400  510  600  1.03  
15  9  12  0.0002  0.084  0  400  510  600  1.03  
16  10  11  0.0002  0.084  0  400  510  600  1.015  
17  10  12  0.0002  0.084  0  400  510  600  1.015  
18  11  13  0.006  0.048  0.1  500  600  625  0  
19  11  14  0.005  0.042  0.088  500  600  625  0  
20  12  13  0.006  0.048  0.1  500  600  625  0  
22  12  23  0.012  0.097  0.203  500  600  625  0  
23  13  23  0.011  0.087  0.182  500  600  625  0  
24  15  16  0.002  0.017  0.036  500  600  625  0  
25  15  21  0.006  0.049  0.103  500  600  625  0  
26  15  21  0.006  0.049  0.103  500  600  625  0  
27  15  24  0.007  0.052  0.109  500  600  625  0  
28  16  17  0.003  0.026  0.055  500  600  625  0  
29  16  19  0.003  0.023  0.049  500  600  625  0  
30  17  18  0.002  0.014  0.03  500  600  625  0  
31  17  22  0.014  0.105  0.221  500  600  625  0  
32  18  21  0.003  0.026  0.055  500  600  625  0  




34  19  20  0.005  0.04  0.083  500  600  625  0  
35  19  20  0.005  0.04  0.083  500  600  625  0  
36  20  23  0.003  0.022  0.046  500  600  625  0  
37  20  23  0.003  0.022  0.046  500  600  625  0  
38  21  22  0.009  0.068  0.142  500  600  625  0  
CON = Continuous rating  
LTE = Long-term emergency rating (24 hour)  
STE = Short-term emergency rating (15 min)  
Tr = Transformer off-nominal tap ratio 
 
Table 7.4 Branch Reliability Data for the IEEE-RTS 
ID 
#  
From Bus  To Bus  Permanent 
 λp        Duration 
Transient  
λt 
1  1  2  0.24  16  0.0  
2  1  3  0.51  10  2.9  
3  1  5  0.33  10  1.2  
4  2  4  0.39  10  1.7  
5  2  6  0.48  10  2.6  
6  3  9  0.38  10  1.6  
7  3  24  0.02  768  0.0  
8  4  9  0.36  10  1.4  
9  5  10  0.34  10  1.2  
10  6  10  0.33  35  0.0  
11  7  8  0.30  10  0.8  
12  8  9  0.44  10  2.3  
13  8  10  0.44  10  2.3  
14  9  11  0.02  768  0.0  
15  9  12  0.02  768  0.0  
16  10  11  0.02  768  0.0  
17  10  12  0.02  768  0.0  
18  11  13  0.40  11  0.8  
19  11  14  0.39  11  0.7  
20  12  13  0.40  11  0.8  
22  12  23  0.52  11  1.6  
23  13  23  0.49  11  1.5  
24  15  16  0.33  11  0.3  
25  15  21  0.41  11  0.8  
26  15  21  0.41  11  0.8  




28  16  17  0.35  11  0.4  
29  16  19  0.34  11  0.4  
30  17  18  0.32  11  0.2  
31  17  22  0.54  11  1.8  
32  18  21  0.35  11  0.4  
33  18  21  0.35  11  0.4  
34  19  20  0.38  11  0.7  
35  19  20  0.38  11  0.7  
36  20  23  0.34  11  0.4  
37  20  23  0.34  11  0.4  
38  21  22  0.45  11  1.2  
λp = Permanent Outage Rate (outages/year) 
Duration = Permanent Outage Duration (hours) 
λt = Transient Outage Rate (outages/year) 
7.2 The Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) 
In this section, the information of the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) that was used for 
demonstrating the proposed framework of Chapter 6 is presented [185].  
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2 20 7 
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4 40 13 
5 20 7 






















1 1 3 0.0342 0.1800 0.0106 1.00 0.85 1.50 10.0 
2 2 4 0.1140 0.6000 0.0352 1.00 0.71 5.00 10.0 
3 1 2 0.0912 0.4800 0.0282 1.00 0.71 4.00 10.0 
4 3 4 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.0 
5 3 5 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.0 
6 1 3 0.0342 0.1800 0.0106 1.00 0.71 1.50 10.0 
7 2 4 0.1140 0.6000 0.0352 1.00 0.85 5.00 10.0 
8 4 5 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.0 
9 5 6 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.0 
 
Table 7.7 Generator data for the RBTS 
Unit No. Bus No. Rating 
(MW) 
1 1 40.0 
2 1 40.0 
3 1 10.0 
4 1 20.0 
5 2 5.0 
6 2 5.0 
7 2 40.0 
8 2 20.0 
9 2 20.0 
10 2 20.0 
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